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Introduction 
Human memory is a key focus of scientific and theoretical attention within a range of disciplines, and 
it is also an important target of efforts that seek to improve aspects of human cognitive function. 
The phenomenon of memory is also something that has been seen as a key test for theories of 
distributed, situated and extended cognition, not least because memory seems to take us out of the 
current situation and put us in psychological contact with a set of previously experienced state-of-
affairs. As Sutton (2009) comments, “The challenge set by the nature of human memory to theories 
of situated cognition...is to see how social or material resources outside the brain could possibly be 
an integral or constitutive feature of memory states or processes, when the events or episodes 
remembered are long gone” (pg. 229). This is deemed to pose a challenge to theories of cognition 
that emphasize the importance of extra-neural structures and resources in scaffolding, sculpting, 
and (in the case of extended cognition) realizing cognitive processes (Clark, 2008; Robbins & Ayded, 
2009).  
In addition to the challenge posed to extended cognition accounts, memory also raises interesting 
issues when it comes to the potential impact of certain new techniques and technologies, all of 
which seem poised to exert some effect on our mnemonic functioning. For example, the increasing 
availability of life-logging technologies (O'Hara et al., 2009), coupled with the increasing use of the 
Web as a storage medium for personal data, raises important questions about the potential of the 
Web to ‘enhance’ our mnemonic capabilities. A critical question here concerns the extent to which 
we can treat Web-based resources as counting as part of our memory system. For example, if we are 
enabled to have more-or-less immediate, reliable, and easy access to bodies of information on the 
Web, does that information count as part of our own body of knowledge and beliefs about the world 
– in the same way, perhaps, as the content of our  biologically-based (semantic) memories? If it 
does, then it seems we are only a few technological steps away from an era in which the limits of our 
personal knowledge are defined by the extent of the Web’s reach.  
The aims of this particular paper are threefold. The first aim is to review the literature relating to 
cognitive extension and the extended mind and to illustrate how these ideas are relevant to the case 
of memory. A second aim is to consider the value of an extended cognition account in thinking about 
memory phenomena. The focus here is on the role played by external (non-biological) physical and 
social resources in shaping our mnemonic capabilities. A third and final aim for the paper is to 
consider  a  variety  of  issues  related  to  the  design  of  memory  technologies.  Important  areas  of 
discussion  here  include  the  extent  to  which  memory  technologies  should  aim  to  support  the 
accurate recall of previously experienced information, as well as the role of biology in guiding the 
design of memory technologies.  Extended Memory 
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Movies, Memories and the Extended Mind 
Memento 
Human  memory  features  as  a  key  focus  of  attention  in  a  broad  range  of  academic  disciplines. 
Biologists, psychologists, philosophers, sociologists, media theorists, computer scientists, and others: 
all have contributed in one form or another to our understanding (or misunderstanding) of memory. 
However, it is not just the scientific and philosophical community that have expressed an interest in 
memory. Memory has also been a focus of attention in the literary and cinematic community. In the 
case of cinema, films such as Blade Runner, The Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind and Total 
Recall are all films in which memory features as a key thematic element. However, perhaps the most 
compelling cinematic treatment of human memory in recent years, and the one that is most relevant 
to  the  current  paper,  is  Christopher  Nolan’s  Memento.  There  are  a  number  of  ways  in  which 
Memento is relevant to the present discussion, but first it will help to provide an overview of what 
the movie is actually about. 
Memento tells the story of Leonard (Lennie) Shelby, a former insurance investigator, who suffers 
from  a  form  of  anterograde  amnesia.  Lennie’s  condition  results  from  a  head  trauma  that  was 
sustained while attempting to defend his wife from an attack some time before the events of the 
movie take place. We are led to believe that during the attack, Lennie’s wife was raped and killed, 
and  that  Lennie,  driven  by  a  desire  for  vengeance,  is  intent  on  finding  and  killing  the  person 
responsible for his wife’s death. Here, however, Lennie faces a problem. The nature of his memory 
impairment makes it difficult for him to form new memories. His long-term memories leading up to 
the attack are unaffected, but since the attack on his wife Lennie is unable to form any new long-
term memories. Lennie’s life is thus lived as a series of short, disjointed episodes, each supported 
only by the capacity of his short-term memory
1. The only way in which Lennie can make any sense of 
his ongoing experiences, is by constantly referring to an array of self -generated resources, such as 
hand-written notes, annotated pho tos, and  body  tattoos. These provide some sort of historical 
context for the situations Lennie finds himself in, and they also serve to guide his thought and 
actions in (hopefully) goal-appropriate ways. Although the resources Lennie relies on seem to serve 
as poor substitutes for biological memory, Lennie is undeterred by the seemingly ersatz nature of his 
‘external memories’. In fact, he believes his system of storing information in external resources is 
actually an improvement on biological memory: “Memory's unreliable...Memory's not perfect,” says 
Lennie, “It's not even that good. Ask the police; eyewitness testimony is unreliable...Memory can 
change the shape of a room or the color of a car. It's an interpretation, not a record. Memories can 
be changed or distorted, and they're irrelevant if you have the facts.” By systematically exploiting 
the resources he creates, Lennie believes he will eventually be able to achieve his aim; he will 
eventually be able to piece together the mystery of his wife’s death, track down his wife’s killer, and 
exact his revenge.  
Memento is a movie about many things besides memory – trust, grief, identity, knowledge, moral 
responsibility, agency, etc. – and some of these topics surface (albeit superficially) throughout the 
                                                           
1 The nature of Lennie’s fractured consciousness is reflected in the narrative structure of the film, which 
features two inter-leaved chronologies, one running forward, the other backward. The result, for the viewer, 
at least on a first viewing, is somewhat bewildering. The narrative structure of the movie enables the viewer to 
identify with Lennie both subjectively and epistemologically. Like Lennie, the viewer is left trying to make 
sense of each scene with a limited amount of background information to support their interpretation. Extended Memory 
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remainder of this paper. One thing, however, that is of key significance to the present discussion is 
the  method  used  by  Lennie  to  cope  with  his  memory  impairment;  i.e.  his  systematic  creation, 
maintenance  and  exploitation  of  a  rich  array  of  information-bearing  artefacts  (i.e.  the 
aforementioned  notes,  photos  and tattoos).  These resources  arguably  function  in  a  way that  is 
reminiscent of our biological memories: they serve to guide and structure Lennie’s thoughts and 
actions in a way that is similar to that served by biological memory. To the extent this is true, we 
might be inclined to say that some of Lennie’s mnemonic capabilities are no longer solely supported 
by  the  machinations  of  Lennie’s  brain.  Instead,  we  might  be  inclined  to  say  that  some  of  the 
machinery underlying Lennie’s memory now extends beyond the biological borders of the brain to 
include elements of the external, (self-created) informational environment that Lennie inhabits. In 
other words, we could say that parts of Lennie’s mind no longer solely depend on the whirrings and 
grindings of Lennie’s damaged brain. Lennie’s mind is now an extended mind. It is a mind that 
depends on an environmentally extended nexus of representational and computational elements  
(see Smart et al., 2010). 
Such, at least, is the view suggested by a recently influential approach to mind and cognition, first 
proposed  by  Clark  and  Chalmer’s  (1998).  The  approach  goes  via  a  variety  of  names,  such  as  
locational externalism (Wilson, 2000, 2004), active externalism (Clark & Chalmers, 1998), vehicle 
externalism  (Hurley,  1998;  Rowlands,  2006),  environmentalism  (Rowlands,  1999),  cognitive 
extension (Clark, 2008) and the extended mind (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). What all of these locutions 
have in common is a commitment to the idea that aspects of the external, extra-neural environment 
can, at certain times, play a constitutive role in the material realization of the mind (or aspects 
thereof). If such a view is true, then the implications for our understanding of memory and the role 
played by memory technologies in shaping, scaffolding, and perhaps even supplanting our biological 
memories are indeed profound. Before we move onto such issues, however, it is worth fleshing out 
the notions of cognitive extension and the extended mind in a little more detail. 
Cognitive Extension 
Consider the webs of the garden cross spider, Araneus diadematus. The webs, like that of most 
spider’s webs, are architecturally complex, composed as they are of multiple types of silk thread, 
each laid down in a specific sequence and geometric pattern. Specific types of thread need to be 
produced at just the right time, and the overall design of the web has to be sensitive to a number of 
factors including the size of the prey to be caught and the shape of the local environment (the shape 
made available by local branches or other supporting structures). Presumably, in order to build its 
web, the spider needs some ability to remember the specific steps involved in constructing a web, 
and while constructing the web, it needs to know exactly where it is in the overall process in order to 
know what to do next. The former ability, we might say, is the spider’s long-term memory (the 
spider’s memory of the steps required to build a web), while the latter ability is the spider’s working 
memory (the spider’s memory of task-relevant information that is used to guide decision-making in 
goal-appropriate  ways).  So,  when  it  comes  to  web  construction  spiders  seems  to  be  pretty 
sophisticated critters, and this view is reinforced when we think of a range of other behaviours that 
spiders are capable of, from optimal route selection in the case of the araneophagic spiders (Barrett, 
2011, chapter 4; Tarsitano & Jackson, 1997) through to deceptive signalling in the case of jumping 
spiders (Wilcox & Jackson, 2002). The problem is that the spider’s capacity for planning, decision-
making, memory, judgment and problem-solving seem to be out of kilter with our intuitions about 
the complexity of the mechanistic substrate required to support such abilities. As invertebrates, Extended Memory 
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spider’s do not have a real brain; instead, their central nervous system is composed of a number of 
ganglia (collections of neural tissue), of which the most prominent are the supraesophagal and 
subesophagal ganglia. These ganglia serve to implement and coordinate the majority of the spider’s 
sensorimotor functions. The surprising thing is that the total number of neurons in the spider’s 
central nervous system is relatively small, at least when we compare it to the 100 billion neurons of 
the average human brain. The wandering spider, Cupiennius, for example, has 100,000 neurons, 
while the orb web spider,  Argiope, has a  nervous system composed of a mere  30,000 neurons 
(Foelix, 1996). These numbers do not seem particularly large given the kind of behaviours spiders are 
capable of. And they certainly do not seem sufficient for us to attribute cognitive capabilities like 
planning, memory, decision-making and so on. The machinery of the mind, in the case of the spider, 
seems far too small and insufficiently complex to warrant  the spider’s treatment as a cognitive 
agent. And yet the spider clearly functions very well in the world, despite its rather meagre set of 
neurocomputational resources. Despite having a nervous system that features fewer neurons than 
are encountered in some artificial neural networks, spiders seem very adept at finding intelligent 
solutions to challenging problems. How exactly do they do it? 
The answer, at least in the case of web construction, seems to lie not so much in the details of the 
spider’s nervous system, as in the nature of the spider’s interaction with the external (extra-neural) 
environment. In particular, a detailed ethological examination of web spinning behaviour suggests 
that spiders are sensitive to a range of bodily contingencies involving the relative positioning of their 
legs on certain types of silk thread (Krink & Vollrath, 1997, 1998, 1999). As the web develops, the 
positioning  of  the  spider’s  legs  becomes  a  reliable  cue  as  to  what  type  of  action  needs  to  be 
executed next, as well as what type of silk needs to be produced. In essence, the web serves as “its 
own best model” (see Brooks, 1991) of what needs to be accomplished, and the spider need only be 
responsive to local information concerning the structural organization of threads in the immediate 
vicinity of its body. At each stage of the web construction process, each of the spider’s legs need 
only  perform  a  local  (spatial)  search  for  the  nearest  thread,  and,  once  located,  the  relative 
positioning of the legs (as well as the type of thread they are in contact with) ‘represents’ the web’s 
structural status. In response to this rich body of local information, the spider need only implement 
locally-effective rules concerning which action to perform. And it turns out that aspects of spider 
web weaving behaviour can be modelled using a relatively simple (and minimal) set of rules (Krink & 
Vollrath, 1997, 1999). Importantly, each rule exploits facts about the spider’s bodily design, and its 
outputs  specify  actions  that  are  geared  to  structuring  the  problem  space  in  ways  that  guide, 
constrain and structure subsequent behaviour. The spider, it seems, distributes the computational 
burden associated with web spinning behaviour across a complex system that comprises its brain, 
body and aspects of the (self-structured) external environment
2. 
The moral of this story, then, is that it is easy to be misled into thinking that intelligent actio n is 
always the sole product of neural mechanisms  – that the point source of intelligent behaviour is 
always something that must reside in the ‘head’ of an agent. For what the case of web construction 
teaches us is that agents may often co-opt a variety of far flung forces and factors into a problem-
solving routine, and not all of these forces and factors need be biological in nature. When seen in a 
                                                           
2 Its body is (perhaps non-accidentally) designed so as to best exploit this state of affairs – you can represent 
quite a lot of information when your representational repertoire is sensitive  to the spatial dynamics of a 
system comprising eight articulated appendages! Extended Memory 
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certain light, the external environment emerges as more than just a space for sensory inputs and 
motor outputs; it is also poised to play an important (explanatorily-potent) role in the mechanisms 
by  which  that  behaviour  is  realized.  Intelligent  behaviour,  we  might  say,  is  at  least  sometimes 
realized by processing loops that extend beyond the neural realm and productively incorporate a 
variety  of  extra-neural  resources.  Some  forms  of  behavioural  intelligence  are  environmentally-
extended with regard to their mechanistic realization. 
Accounts like this, which emphasize the contribution of bio-external factors in the mediation of 
intelligent  behaviour,  are  relatively  common  in  the  cognitive  scientific  literature,  and  they  are 
typically cases of what Wheeler and Clark (Wheeler, 2005; Wheeler & Clark, 1999) have referred to 
as ‘non-trivial causal spread’. According to Wheeler and Clark, we encounter cases of non-trivial 
causal spread whenever we confront a phenomenon that has the initial appearance of being the 
product of a well-demarcated system, but which, on closer inspection, turns out to involve the 
exploitation of a variety of other forces and factors. And whenever we have a case of non-trivial 
causal spread, we also have a case of explanatory spread; i.e. a relative expansion of our explanatory 
frameworks to account for the phenomenon in question. Such spread seeks to give explanatory 
weight to factors that were initially supposed to be causally-irrelevant with respect to some target 
phenomenon, and in cases where the target phenomenon is a cognitive process then it seems to 
make sense to see the causally-active physical vehicles of the process as extending beyond the inner, 
neural realm. Inasmuch as we equate the boundaries of a cognitive system with the physical limits of 
the mechanisms that comprise that system’s cognitive processing routines, then cognition is, at least 
sometimes, not bounded by the traditional borders of skin and skull; it emerges as something that is 
perfectly able to extend beyond the head and seep into the world. 
Cases  of  non-trivial  causal  spread  are  evident  throughout  much  of  the  distributed,  situated, 
embodied and extended cognition literatures (Clark, 1997; Haugeland, 1998; Wilson, 2002), and they 
are also increasingly evident in the work of roboticists and ethologists (Barrett, 2011; Dawson et al., 
2010; Pfeifer & Bongard, 2007; Pfeifer & Scheier, 1998). As a further example of non-trivial casual 
spread, Clark (1997) cites the example of the bluefin tuna, which is able to accomplish feats of 
swimming efficiency that seem to surpass that deemed possible based solely on a consideration of 
the tuna’s biomechanical profile (the parallels with the case of web construction, in terms of a 
mismatch  between  the  apparent  biological  make-up  of  the  organism  and  the  behavioural 
performances it is capable of, should be obvious). At first blush, it might appear necessary to assume 
that the tuna’s swimming capabilities are necessarily grounded in the details of the tuna’s physiology 
(its streamlined shape and powerful muscles), and that there must be some aspect of the tuna’s 
physiology that has been overlooked. This, however, is not the case. Tuna, as it turns out, use their 
biological swimming apparatus to create and then exploit vortices in the water, and it is this that 
accounts for their otherwise mysterious natatorial capabilities (Triantafyllou & Triantafyllou, 1995). 
As with the case of spider web construction, what we see here is a case of brain, body and world 
working  in  concert  to  achieve  performances  that  would  otherwise  be  difficult  or  impossible  to 
achieve if left entirely to biological elements. As Clark notes, the real ‘swimming machine’, in the 
case of the bluefin tuna, is not simply the biologically-bounded tuna but the tuna in its proper 
environmental  context  –  the  tuna  plus  the  aqueous  medium  that  it  exploits  to  its  own  ends. 
Likewise, we can say that in the case of web construction the real ‘spinning machine’ is not simply 
the spider but the spider plus the environmental structures that it creates and subsequently exploits 
in the context of its web spinning activity.  Extended Memory 
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All  of  this,  I  suggest,  encourages  us  to  question  whether  the  machinery  of  cognition  is  solely 
biological (neural) in nature. It is common for us to see mental states and processes as having their 
material roots in whatever it is the brain does, and, in fact, this notion is now so much a part of our 
intellectual heritage that it is difficult for us to see things any other way. Yet just because the brain 
plays an undoubtedly important role in cognition, this does not mean that we can fully understand 
cognition by focusing all of our explanatory attention on the brain alone. Perhaps, as in the case of 
swimming and spinning, our understanding of cognition should be grounded in an appreciation of 
the  way  in  which  the  biological  brain  works  in  concert  with  a  variety  of  other,  non-biological 
resources. Inasmuch as this is true, then we may need to broaden our explanatory focus beyond the 
neural realm – we may need to see the ‘cognitive machine’ (Smart, 2010) as something more than 
that which resides solely within the head. 
The Extended Mind Hypothesis 
The  previous  section  highlighted  the  way  in  which  certain  types  of  intelligent  behaviour  and 
cognitive processing seem to include (as wholes do their proper parts) mechanisms that extend 
beyond the traditional biological borders of skin and skull. The specific claim is that, under at least 
some conditions, we are warranted in seeing cognition as, quite literally, extending into the extra-
organismic environment. The argument as currently presented, however, might be seen as applying 
to  a  narrow  subset  of mental  states  and  processes,  at  least  relative to  those  that  we  typically 
associate with a human mind. In accounting for much of the behaviour of both ourselves and others 
we typically make reference to a set of common-sense, mentalistic terms (such as belief, desire, 
hope, fear, and so on), and these are seen as playing a genuine explanatory role in psychologically-
interesting patterns of behaviour. Thus, my action to retrieve a cookie from the pantry is explained 
in terms of my ‘desire’ to eat a cookie and my ‘belief’ that cookies are to be found  in pantries. It is 
this kind of intentional characterization (the ascription of intentional mental states) that helps us 
make sense of (to understand) patterns of human behaviour – it enables us to gain a predictively 
and explanatorily potent toehold on patterns of behaviour that would otherwise be psychologically 
unintelligible  to  us.  So  the  question  that  arises  in  the  case  of  cognitively-extended  systems  is 
whether the notion of cognitive extension gains any purchase in the more ethereal domain of folk-
psychological discourse (the strategy of explaining human behaviour with respect to mental states, 
such  as  belief  and  desire).  Can  the  notion  of  cognitive  extension,  as  currently  presented,  be 
extended to account for the mental states that are posited as causally-relevant to the psychological 
understanding of our everyday patterns of behaviour? Can we, in other words, extend the case of an 
environmentally-extended  cognitive  system  to  the  more  general  case  of  an  environmentally-
extended mind?  
It is here (perhaps not surprisingly) that the philosophical waters begin to run deep. Perhaps the 
most lucid and influential account of why we should take notions such as extended belief states 
seriously is provided by Clark and Chalmers (1998) in their classic paper, ‘The Extended Mind’. Clark 
and Chalmers (1998) ask us to imagine two individuals: Inga and Otto, both of whom are situated in 
New York City. Inga is a normal human agent with all the usual cognitive competences, but Otto 
suffers  from  a  mild  form  of  dementia  and  is  thus  impaired  when  it  comes  to  certain  acts  of 
information storage and recall. To attenuate the impact of his impairment on his daily behaviour, 
Otto relies on a conventional notebook which he uses to store important pieces of information. Otto 
is so reliant on the notebook and so accustomed to using it that he carries the notebook with him 
wherever he goes and accesses the notebook fluently and automatically whenever he needs to do Extended Memory 
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so. Having thus set the stage, Clark and Chalmers (1998) ask us to imagine a case where both Otto 
and Inga wish to visit the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA) to see a particular exhibition. Inga thinks 
for a moment, recalls that the museum is on 53
rd street and then walks to the museum. It is clear 
that in making this episode of behaviour intelligible (or psychologically transparent) to us Inga must 
have desired to enter the museum, and it is clear that she walked to 53
rd street because she believed 
that that was where the museum was located. Obviously, Inga did not believe that the museum was 
on 53
rd street in an occurrent sense (i.e. she has not spent her entire life consciously thinking about 
the museum’s location); rather, she entertained the belief in a dispositional sense. Inga’s belief, like 
perhaps many of her beliefs, was sitting in memory, waiting to be accessed as and when needed. 
Now consider the case of Otto. Otto hears about the exhibition, decides to visit the museum, and 
then consults his notebook to retrieve the museum’s location. The notebook says the museum is on 
53
rd street, and so that is where Otto goes. Now, in accounting for Otto’s actions we conclude, pretty 
much as we did for Inga, that Otto desired to go to the museum and that he walked to 53
rd street 
because that is where he believed the museum was located. Obviously, Otto did not believe that the 
museum was on 53
rd street in an occurrent sense (Otto has not spent much of his life constantly 
looking  at  the  particular  page  in  his  notebook  containing  museum-related  facts);  rather,  he 
entertained the belief in a dispositional sense. Otto’s belief, like perhaps many of his beliefs, was 
sitting in the notebook, waiting to be accessed as and when needed.  
Clark and Chalmers  (1998) thus argue that the case of Otto establishes the case for a form of 
externalism about Otto’s states of dispositional believing. The notebook, they argue, plays a role 
that is functionally akin to the role played by Inga’s onboard bio-memory. If this is indeed the case, 
then it seems to make sense to see the notebook as part of the material supervenience base for 
some of Otto’s mental states, specifically his states of dispositional belief (such as those involving 
museum locations). The main point of the argument is to establish a (potential) role for external 
artefacts in constituting the physical machinery of at least some of our mental states and processes. 
If, as Clark and Chalmers (1998) argue, the functional contribution of an external device is the same 
as  that  provided  by  some  inner  resource,  then  it  seems  unreasonable  to  restrict  the  material 
mechanisms of the mind to the inner, neural realm. It seems possible, at least in principle, for the 
human mind to occasionally extend beyond the head and into the external world. 
Such claims are, understandably, disconcerting, and it is important that we understand the precise 
nature of the claim that is being made. One immediate cause for concern relates to the notion of 
functional  equivalence  between  the  inner  (e.g.  bio-memory)  and  outer  (e.g.  notebook) 
contributions.  If  we  allow  any  form  of  externally-derived  influence  to  count  as  part  of  the 
mechanistic substrate of the mind, then doesn’t this cast the mechanistic net too widely? Don’t we 
end up confronting cases that are so blatantly counter-intuitive that they undermine the very notion 
of the mind as a proper focus of scientific and philosophical enquiry? Consider, for example, the case 
where two people have a conversation on the bus. Does this mean that their respective minds have 
merged into one integrated whole? And what about cases where we have some very loose coupling 
with an external information source, say the kind of access we have to information in a conventional 
textbook? Clearly, not all of the technologies or external resources that we encounter are apt to 
engage in the kind of bio-technological hybridization envisioned by the extended mind hypothesis. 
As Clark (1997) argues: Extended Memory 
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“There would be little value in an analysis that credited me with knowing all the facts in 
the Encyclopaedia Britannica just because I paid the monthly installments and found 
space for it my garage” (pg. 217).  
Similarly, it would be foolish to equate my personal body of knowledge and beliefs as co-extensive 
with the informational contents of the internet simply because I have an internet-enabled mobile 
phone.  What,  then,  are  the  conditions  under  which  we  count  a  set  of  external  resources  as 
constituting  part  of  an  environmentally-extended  mind?  In  answering  this  question,  Clark  and 
Chalmers (1998) embrace a particular set of criteria, ones that appeal to the accessibility, portability, 
reliability and trustworthiness of the external resource. The criteria are that:  
1.  “…the  resource  must  be  available  and  typically  invoked”  (Clark,  2010).  [Availability 
Criterion] 
2.  “…any  information…retrieved  from  *the  non-biological  resource  must]  be  more-or-less 
automatically  endorsed.  It  should  not  usually  be  subject  to  critical  scrutiny  (unlike  the 
opinions  of  other  people,  for  example).  It  should  be  deemed  about  as  trustworthy  as 
something retrieved clearly from biological memory” (Clark, 2010). [Trust Criterion] 
3.  “…information contained in the resource should be easily accessible as and when required”. 
(Clark, 2010) [Accessibility Criterion] 
Clearly, such criteria serve to guide and constrain our intuitions about the kind of bio-artifactual and 
bio-technological couplings that are relevant to the formation of an extended mind. And they do so 
precisely because they delimit the range of situations under which we recognize the capabilities 
engendered by an external resource as being (most plausibly) that of a specific individual (or agent). 
In other words, what is important about the various criteria Clark and Chalmers (1998) propose is 
that  they  ensure  that  the  capacities  of  an  environmentally-extended,  bio-technologically  hybrid 
system are most plausibly seen by external observers (and perhaps by the agents themselves) as the 
capacities and features of a particular agent. As Wilson and Clark (2009) suggest: 
“We properly expect our individual agents to be mobile, more or less reliable, bundles of 
stored knowledge and computational, emotional and inferential capacities. So we need to 
be  persuaded  that  the  new  capacities  enabled  by  the  addition  of  the  notebook  are 
likewise  sufficiently  robust  and  enduring  as  to  contribute  to  the  persisting  cognitive 
profile we identify as Otto the agent. The bulk of Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) work was 
an attempt to isolate and defend a specific account of the conditions under which we 
would be justified in identifying such an extended mind.” (pg. 67).  
What  we  seem  to  confront,  then,  is  a  set  of  what  might  generally  be  referred  to  as  coupling 
conditions, conditions that determine when we are and when we are not justified in identifying 
cases of cognitive extension that apply to the realm of folk-psychological theorizing. In all cases of 
cognitive extension, what seems to be important is a particular pattern of temporally fine-tuned 
information flow and influence within a networked ensemble of diverse resources. This network 
constitutes the mechanistic substrate of an extended cognitive system whenever the objective of 
that system, or the task in which it is engaged, is recognizably cognitive in nature. However, this 
networked ensemble need not be permanent in nature. It can be a one-off organization that is 
assembled for the purposes of a specific cognitive task, or it can be a temporary but repeatable 
organization that is assembled to deal with an intermittent or periodically-occurring task (see Wilson Extended Memory 
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& Clark, 2009). When the organization is more permanent, we approach the kind of conditions under 
which  we  count  the  external  resource  as  constituting  part  of  the  material  supervenience  base 
associated  with  an  agent’s  daily  patterns  of  psychologically-interesting  behaviour.  These  are 
precisely  the  kind  of  conditions  under  which  we  are  justified  in  seeing  the  emergence  of  an 
environmentally-extended mind. 
The thought experiment invoked by Clark and Chalmers to support their notion of an extended mind 
raises important questions about the possibility of environmentally-extended memory systems. In 
particular, the way in which Otto uses his notebook seems to justify its inclusion as part of his 
cognitive  apparatus  –  the  notebook  is  essentially  serving  as  a  means  by  which  some  of  Otto’s 
memory functions can be implemented. The notion of cognitive extension also appears applicable to 
the case of Lennie in the movie, Memento. Lennie relies on a broader array of resources than Otto; 
however, his behaviour, like Otto’s, is guided by the content of external resources in pretty much the 
same way as information retrieved from bio-memory
3.  
Obviously, Otto and Lennie are fictional cases, so one question that begins to loom large hereabouts 
is the extent to which the notion of the extended mind is applic able to real-world cases of memory 
function? Does the extended mind thesis gain any traction when it comes to a consideration of 
human memory as encountered in everyday situations? Furthermore, what are the implications of 
the extended mind thesis for the  design of memory technologies?  The answers to these two 
questions are ones that will occupy us for the remainder of the paper.  
Memory in the Real World 
One way to press the case for an extended mind approach to memory is to consider the nature of 
memory as we typically encounter it in the real world. Of course, it is quite possible that all forms of 
memory, as currently constituted, are not extended and do not rely on external elements for their 
mechanistic realization. Even if this were so, it would not rule out the possibility of an extended 
approach to future forms of memory: ones in which technological artefacts are used to work in 
concert  with  the  biological  brain  in  order  support  (or  supplant)  bio-memory  capabilities. 
Nevertheless, I think there are grounds for adopting distributed, situated or extended perspectives 
when it comes to our understanding of everyday mnemonic functioning as it is currently constituted. 
In  the  sections  that  follow,  I  present  a  number  of  cases  where  a  consideration  of  the  facts of 
material  embodiment  and  environmental  embedding  can  contribute  to  our  understanding  of 
memory phenomena. 
Exploiting Environmental Structure 
Perhaps the most obvious way in which the environment is employed in the service of memory is 
evident  in  those  cases  where  we  structure  the  environment  in  ways  that  meliorate  memory 
                                                           
3 An interesting issue here concerns the extent to which Lennie fulfils the coupling conditions proposed by 
Clark for extended cognitive systems. These are the conditions of availability, trust and accessibility. Certainly, 
Lennie fulfils the criteria of availability: he carries his notebook, photos and (obviously) his tattoos with him 
wherever he goes, and he relies on them in most situations. He also seems to fulfil the trust condition. In fact, 
for reasons that will become clear later in the paper, it is his trust in the information retrieved from external 
resources that is the source of his undoing. Finally, regarding the issue of accessibility, Lennie accesses his 
resources more or less automatically, and most of his resources are easily accessible to him. Without question, 
the resources are not as accessible as bio-memories, but it is not clear that this undermines their status as part 
of Lennie’s ‘memory machine’. Extended Memory 
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processes. Examples include the deliberate marking or tagging of items to reduce memory load (see 
Dennett, 1996, chapter 5), as well as the creation of cues (photos, notes, and so on) to assist us with 
retrieval operations. These activities are typically explained in terms of the offloading of memory 
onto the physical environment. As Dennett (1996) writes: 
“Putting  deliberate  marks  on  the  environment...is  an  excellent  way  of  reducing  the 
cognitive load on your perception and memory.” (pg. 135) 
One particularly compelling example of how environmental structure is used to reduce cognitive 
load is provided by Beach’s (1988) analysis of how expert bartenders remember a lengthy drinks 
order. The study (discussed in Clark (2008)) emphasizes how bartenders rely on the specific shape of 
glasses, as well as their spatial sequence in order to effectively remind them of what drinks to serve, 
and the order in which to serve them. Commenting on this work, Clark (2008) writes: 
“The problem of remembering which drink to prepare next is thus transformed, as a 
result of learning within this prestructured niche, into the problem of perceiving the 
different shapes and associating each shape with a kind of drink. The bartender, by 
creating persisting spatially arrayed stand-ins for the drink orders, actively structures 
the local environment to press more utility from basic modes of visually cued action and 
recall. In this way, the exploitation of the physical situation allows relatively lightweight 
cognitive strategies to reap large rewards.” (pg.62) 
Of course, individuals do not always structure their environment in ways that support the recall of 
information. Sometimes they deliberately structure their environment in ways that help them to 
forget.  For  example,  people  may  avoid  exposure  to  contexts  and  cues  that  remind  them  of 
unpleasant incidents. Such motivated changes in context or cue exposure can support forgetting 
processes  in  a  number  of  ways  (see  Baddeley  et  al.,  2009,  chapter  10).  Firstly,  cue  avoidance 
prevents memories from being retrieved, and the absence of retrieval practice makes the memory 
subject to normal decay processes. Secondly, changes in environmental context often bring about 
changes  in  incidental  context  (e.g.  mood  state),  which  then  hinders  the  retrieval  of  unwanted 
memories. The main point here, as before, is that the individual can play an active role in structuring 
the environment so as to support the realization of a number of mnemonic objectives. 
The World as External Memory 
Our  conventional  view  of  memory  is  that  it  involves  the  storage  of  previously  encountered 
information  using  the  resources  of  our  biological  brains.  Brain-based  forms  of  encoding  are 
obviously useful because we can rely on such encodings to be present whenever we need them to 
be so; for example, during the performance of specific tasks. However, there are situations in which 
the external environment may also provide reliable access to task-relevant information, and, in 
these cases, the world may be seen as serving as a form of external memory (O'Regan, 1992). 
Recall the discussion about the process by which a spider constructs its web. In the context of that 
discussion it became apparent that the spider was using the current state of the environment (i.e. 
the  structure  of  the  web)  as  a  means  to  structure  and  sequence  its  web-building  behaviour.  I 
suggested that the web effectively served as the spider’s working memory of where it was in the 
process of web construction. The construct of working memory seems particularly apt here because 
working memory comes into play whenever we need to temporarily keep task-relevant information 
in mind for the purposes of accomplishing a specific task (e.g. as means of enabling us to progress Extended Memory 
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through a series of problem-solving steps). Thus, one case where the use of working memory is 
evident  is  in  the  case  of  multiplying  two  numbers.  Imagine  that  you  are  asked  to  solve  a 
multiplication problem such as 21 x 3. If you are like me, you will solve this problem by multiplying 3 
times 1, and then holding the result of this computation in mind, while simultaneously multiplying 3 
times 2. Finally, you will combine the result of both computations yielding the answer – 63. This 
strategy of internal mental calculation and temporary storage is not, however, the only way in which 
we solve multiplication problems. An alternative strategy, particularly useful in the case of long 
multiplication, is to begin to draw on the representational resources of the external environment in 
order to help us with the cognitive demands of the task at hand. Thus, the strategy that most of us 
use in solving long multiplication problems is to draw on the resources of pencil and paper. We 
replace the sequence of neurally-encoded, imaginative manipulations of the problem-space with a 
series  of  perceptuo-motor  routines  that  delegate  important  parts  of  the  task-related 
representational burden to the external world. In place of purely inner computational operations we 
see  a  pattern  of  perception-action  cycles  in  which  single  digit  numbers  are  compared  and 
intermediate computational results are stored in an external medium (i.e. the paper). This example, 
described in Wilson and Clark (2009), is a case of what we might call environmentally-extended 
computation  or  ‘wide  computationalism’  (Wilson,  1994).  It  takes  what  is,  ostensibly,  an  inner 
cognitive  capability  (an  ability  to  do  long  multiplication)  and  shows  how  crucial  aspects  of  the 
problem-solving process can be (and usually are) delegated to aspects of the external environment. 
What has changed in the transition to environmentally-based forms of long multiplication is that the 
use of neural resources to store information has been replaced with the resources of the external 
medium. Conceived of as a working memory task, the paper now appears to be playing the role of 
the  visuo-spatial  sketchpad  component  of  working  memory,  while  the  human  agent,  in  their 
interaction with the external resource, now appears to playing the role of the central executive. It 
seems, therefore, that physical action and environmental structure can sometimes serve the role of 
supporting  working  memory  functions  in  a  way  that  does  not  rely  solely  on  internal  forms  of 
encoding. The essential idea is that, at least in some situations, the external world can function as a 
mnemonic  resource  that  reduces  the  need  to  maintain  an  internal  record  of  task-relevant 
information
4.  
One question we can ask at this point is  when does a human agent rely on a strategy of externa l 
representation and manipulation; at what point do they choose to switch from a strategy of inner, 
brain-based encoding to a strategy of real-world manipulation? The answer to this question seems 
to lie in the amount of time and effort associated with eac h strategy. Thus, if we think about the 
case of long multiplication it is likely that our decision regarding when to recruit the resources of pen 
and paper will depend on the amount of cogni tive effort entailed by the multiplication challenge 
facing us. When the multiplication problem involves relatively small numbers (e.g. ‘3’ and ‘21’), inner 
resources may be sufficient; however, as the demands increase with longer and longer numbers (e.g. 
                                                           
4 This idea of the world serving as a form of external memory is not new. O’Regan  (1992), for example, 
suggests that the world itself can sometimes function as form of external memory that can be continually 
interrogated in place an internal memory store. The idea is also apparent in more recent work concerning the 
nature  of  our  visual  conscious  experiences  (e.g.  Myin  &  O'Regan,  2009),  as  well  as  in  empirical  work 
undertaken as part of the active vision paradigm (e.g. Ballard et al., 1997; see Findlay & Gilchrist, 2003). Extended Memory 
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‘45367’ and ‘23453’), we are increasingly inclined to distribute part of the information processing 
load to the external environment
5.  
Efficiency and reduced cognitive  load may be some of the reasons  why a  switch  to externally-
directed  memory  strategies  is  desirable ;  however,  they  are  not  necessarily  the  only  ones. 
Sometimes, the real-world representation of certain information can support cognitive processing in 
a way that is  not  apparent when we rely on inner imaginings. Thus, consider  Clark’s  (1997) 
discussion of the way in which academic papers typically get written:  
“[the text] does not spring fully formed from inner cogitations. Instead, it is the product 
of a sustained and iterated sequence of interactions between my brain and a variety of 
external props. In these cases, I am willing to say, a good deal of actual thinking involves 
loops and circuits that run outside the head and through the local environment. Extended 
intellectual arguments and theses are almost always the products of brains acting in 
concert  with  multiple  external  resources.  These  resources  enable  us  to  pursue 
manipulations and juxtapositions of ideas and data that would quickly baffle the un-
augmented brain.” (pg. 207) 
In subsequent work, Clark (2007) writes: 
“It is not always that fully-formed thoughts get committed to paper. Rather, the paper 
provides  a  medium  in  which,  this  time  via  some  kind  of  coupled  neural-scribbling-
reading unfolding, we are enabled to explore ways of thinking that might otherwise be 
unavailable to us.” 
The  general  idea  here  is  that  the  act  of  physically  representing  information  in  the  external 
environment and then reprocessing it via the medium of perception may deliver cognitive benefits 
that would not be seen in the case of purely internal processing. When it comes to memory, it may 
be that the physical representation and subsequent perception of retrieval cues serves as a much 
more effective means of prompting recall than the mere imagining of such cues. For example, when 
we hear a small piece of a song on the radio but cannot remember the whole song, it may be more 
effective for us to physically hum the part we heard rather than rely on inner rehearsal. Similarly, 
when we are asked to recall whole words from word fragments (as in ‘M_M_R_Y’) perhaps physical 
representations of the word fragments serve as a better aid to recall than simply imagining the 
fragment. 
This notion of the relative efficacy of externally-represented cues as compared to purely imagined 
ones is still something that needs to be evaluated in empirical studies; however, there are some 
compelling insights into the value of external representation from the work on ambiguous images
6 
                                                           
5  The  importance  of  effort  as  a  deciding  factor  in  switching  to  externally-directed  processing  routines  is 
highlighted by the work of Gray and Fu (2004). They showed that when the cost (as measured in time) of 
accessing some external piece of information exceeds that required to access the same information from bio-
memory, then subjects will resort to internal memorization strategies at the expense of externally-directed 
ones. It thus appears that the time taken to access information (what Gray and Fu refer to as information 
access  cost)  is  the  critical  factor  in  determining  the  extent  to  which  internal  or  external  encodings  are 
exploited during problem-solving activity. It is generally the case that we resort to using the environment as an 
external memory source whenever it is quicker and easier to do so. 
6 Ambiguous images are images which can be seen as either one of two different things. A famous example is 
the duck/rabbit image, which can be interpreted as the head of a duck or a rabbit. Extended Memory 
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(see Chambers & Reisberg, 1985). In one study, for example, subjects were asked to observe and 
remember an ambiguous image. They were then asked to seek an alternative interpretation for the 
image based on their mental image. Finally, the subjects were asked to draw the image and once 
again seek an alternative interpretation. The results from this study were surprising. Despite all the 
subjects reporting vivid mental representations of the original figure, none of them were able to 
discover the alternative interpretation of the figure from their mental images. In contrast, all of the 
subjects were able to see the alternative interpretation in their physical drawings (see Chambers & 
Reisberg, 1985). Commenting on these results Clark (2001) suggests that: 
“...the  subject’s  problem-solving  capacities  are  significantly  extended  by  the  simple 
device  of  externalizing  information  (drawing  the  image  from  memory)  and  then 
confronting the external trace using on-line visual perception.” (pg. 148) 
The processes by which this ‘extension’ in problem-solving capacities takes place is unknown at the 
present time. Further research is required to explore the phenomenon and examine its potential 
applicability to the case of physical cues in promoting better modes of retrieval performance. 
Memory in Social Contexts 
Extended mind  accounts typically focus  on  physical  props,  aids  and  artefacts  in  describing  how 
human cognitive processing is constituted by information processing networks that extend beyond 
the biological realm. Despite this, there is nothing in the bedrock claims of the extended mind thesis 
that precludes the possibility of socially-extended forms of cognition. Although some have expressed 
concern as to whether social resources could ever fulfil the criteria associated with extended minds 
(e.g. Clark & Chalmers, 1998), it is perfectly clear that, as a source of information, other people are 
perfectly able to fulfil the kind of action-guiding role played by (e.g.) notes, knots and other physical 
resources. In fact, some have even gone as far as to suggest that social resources are superior to 
physical resources in terms of fulfilling the conditions for cognitive extension. Tollefsen (2006) thus 
argues that the kind of limitations possessed by physical resources such as notebooks (for example, 
their inability to support the dynamic updating and revision of existing information (see Weiskopf, 
2008)) are not applicable in cases where cognitive processing is socially distributed. In this case, the 
external memory resource (another person) is capable of the kind of dynamic updating capability 
that  some  commentators  (e.g.  Weiskopf,  2008)  see  as  essential  to  cases  of  environmentally-
extended memory. 
When it comes to memory function, social forces and factors have not typically been viewed in the 
same  light  as  their  physical  counterparts.  New  technologies,  such  as  life-logging  technologies, 
wearable  sensor  devices,  global  information  networks,  and  semantically-enriched  information 
resources have all been seen as heralding a new era in the technological augmentation of biological 
memory (Hodges et al., 2006; O'Hara, 2008; O'Hara et al., 2006b; O'Hara et al., 2009; Sellen et al., 
2007). The same sense of optimism does not, however, seem to apply to the elements of our social 
networks.  In  this case,  social  influences  on mnemonic  functioning  have  typically  been  cast  in a 
negative light. Social forces and factors have often been seen as constituting a negative influence on 
individual memory, with any form of social interaction potentially serving to corrupt or distort our 
recall of previously encountered information. As Barnier et al (2008) comment, “external influence is 
typically characterized as primarily negative, the relentless intrusion of the social into malleable 
individual memory.” Extended Memory 
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Certainly, it is true that social influences can and do affect our memories, and sometimes the nature 
of this influence results in us remembering incorrectly (e.g. Loftus, 1997; Roediger et al., 2001). 
However, to denigrate all social influences as inherently malign is to overlook the important ways in 
which social relationships can structure and support memory-related activities. In particular, there 
are a number of ways in which the features of our social networks, and the nature of our social 
interactions within those networks, can and do work to exert a positive influence on mnemonic 
functioning (Barnier et al., 2008; Sutton, 2009; Sutton et al., 2010). In the sections below, I attempt 
to outline a number of ways in which social forces and factors can work to influence our access to 
the past.  
Social Influences in Long-Term Memory Formation 
Joint Reminiscences and Elaborative Rehearsal 
When we think about the factors that determine whether or not we remember something over 
extended periods of time, we typically do not focus our attention on the features of our social 
networks. And yet the structure of our social networks, and the interactive exchanges that take 
place within them, play a potentially significant role in terms of influencing both the content of our 
memory and the form of our remembering activities. Consider, for example, a study by Barnier et al 
(2008), which found that people who maintained contact with old school friends had much better 
memories of their time at school compared to individuals who had lost touch with their school 
friends. There are clearly a number of ways in which we can account for this particular observation; 
however, one potentially fruitful line of investigation may be to see our memories of the past as 
being  supported  by  the  opportunities  we  have  to  revisit  the  past  in  the  context  of  joint 
reminiscences. Thus, by virtue of the fact that we are able to talk about aspects of the shared past 
with our friends and colleagues, we are obliged to repeatedly recall those experiences, and this 
constitutes a form of socially-mediated rehearsal that serves to both strengthen our memories and 
make them more accessible on future occasions. When we fail to revisit the past in the context of 
joint discussions, our opportunities for rehearsal of those particular memories are reduced, and, in 
all likelihood, our access to those memories is weakened as a result. What this hopefully illustrates is 
that the content of our memories can be influenced by the features of our social networks. Social 
ties that endure for prolonged periods of time provide potent links to the distant past, and this can 
contribute to the formation of highly durable memories through the medium of joint reminiscences. 
In a sense, the nature of our social networks, and the nature of the communicative exchanges that 
take place within those networks, mediates our access to the past, and enables us to, in some sense, 
keep it alive. 
But there is another aspect to this socially-mediated vivification of our past lives that goes beyond 
the simple idea of rehearsal. This is the idea that social conversation facilitates a specific form of 
rehearsal: one that is more suited to the formation of enduring long-term memories. Psychologists 
have obviously known that rehearsal plays an important role in memory consolidation for some 
time; however, it is now known that some types of rehearsal are better than others in supporting 
the formation of durable long-term memories. Craik and Lockhart (1972), for example, identified 
two kinds of rehearsal – maintenance rehearsal and elaborative rehearsal – in the context of their 
‘levels of processing theory’. Maintenance rehearsal is a kind of rehearsal that involves the simple 
repetition of to-be-remembered information, whereas elaborative rehearsal involves a much deeper 
kind of analysis: one in which the to-be-remembered information is often subjected to a more in-Extended Memory 
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depth semantic analysis. Importantly, Craik and Lockhart (1972) suggested that elaborative modes of 
rehearsal provide a more effective route to long-term memory as compared to the simple repetition 
of information (i.e. maintenance rehearsal).   
Now, when we think about the way in which we access our memories in social contexts, and the way 
in which those memories are actually used to stimulate, maintain and shape the course of social 
interaction,  it  seems  unlikely  that  the  notion  of  maintenance  rehearsal  is  one  that  adequately 
captures the dynamics of our joint reminiscences. Instead, what seems to be happening is that we 
are encouraged, stimulated and sometimes impelled to engage in a more effortful kind of analysis: a 
kind of analysis that, without the support of the social context, we might be reluctant (or find 
impossible) to engage in. So perhaps one way in which social exchanges contribute to memory is by 
effectively  establishing  the  conditions  under  which  we  engage  in  more  elaborative  modes  of 
rehearsal. By talking about a shared experience in a social context we are obliged to engage in a 
deeper kind of analysis of the past: exploring its significance for the actors involved, assessing its 
relationship to other experiences, and reflecting on its relevance to past, present and future goals. 
All this is likely to entail a deeper kind of analysis of the past than what would be undertaken in the 
case of solitary reminiscences. Even when we do reflect on the past by ourselves, it is unclear 
whether the nature of our processing activity is quite the same as that seen in social contexts. If 
nothing else, our social engagements typically require us to think about our recollections of the past 
from a different standpoint or perspective. 
One reason why elaborative rehearsal may be more effective than maintenance rehearsal is because 
it supports the creation of more retrieval cues. Our ability to remember previously encountered 
information  is  influenced  by  a  number  of  factors,  including  the  associative  strength  between 
retrieval cues and the target memory, the relevance of retrieval cues and the number of retrieval 
cues available (see Baddeley et al., 2009, chapter 8). When we have more cues, we effectively have 
more routes to retrieval, and our chances of recalling the desired information are correspondingly 
increased. Perhaps something like cue creation happens in the course of our discussions about the 
past. Certainly it seems likely that in talking about a shared experience, we are required to examine 
it from a number of different perspectives and consider how it relates to other information. As part 
of  this  process  we  may  come  to  associate  a  past  event  or  situation  with  more  linguistic  cues, 
affective responses, and other associations. Typically, when we discuss events and experiences with 
others we do so in a way that establishes linkages and relationships to other information. This can 
include  the  emotional  impact  on  ourselves  and  others,  the  reason  why  particular  events  and 
situations arose, and so on. By discussing and evaluating these relationships, it is possible to see our 
social interactions as supporting the realization of rehearsal processes that serve to consolidate 
otherwise  fragile  long-term  memories.  Since  these  processes  extend  across both  the  social  and 
biological domains, it is possible to see them as a form of socially-extended cognition: one that 
works as part of our normal everyday mnemonic functioning.  
Flashbulb Memories 
Perhaps something like the aforementioned process of socially-mediated elaborative rehearsal can 
be used to account for the phenomenon of flashbulb memories (Brown & Kulik, 1977). Flashbulb 
memories are our memories of particularly dramatic and emotive events, such as the 9/11 attacks 
on the World Trade Center. These kind of memories are usually very vivid, and they tend to persist Extended Memory 
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for a long period of time, which is surprising given that the events on which they are based tend to 
be of relatively short duration.  
In order to explain flashbulb memories, Brown and Kulik (1977) proposed the existence of a separate 
kind of memory process that works to produce an almost photographic representation of the event 
in question. The process is presumed to be activated by stress or extreme emotion, which seems to 
be a prevailing feature of all the events associated with flashbulb memories.  
Over the years, a number of theories have been  developed to account for flashbulb memories. 
Joseph LeDoux (1996), for example, suggests that when the amygdala detects an aversive situation, 
it activates the autonomic nervous system, which in turn causes the release of adrenaline from the 
adrenal  gland.  It  is  this  release of  adrenaline  that  is  implicated  in  the  strengthening  of  explicit 
memories  at  the  level  of  the  temporal  lobe  memory  system.  In  spite  of  this,  not  everyone  is 
convinced that the phenomenon of flashbulb memory requires the existence of a separate type of 
memory  process.  Neisser  (1997),  for  example,  points  out  that  the  kind  of  events  encoded  by 
flashbulb memories are typically ones that we tend to discuss with others, and it is this discussion 
that makes flashbulb memories memorable, rather than any sort of emotion-mediated physiological 
encoding process. In support of this, Neisser (1997) recounts the results of a study undertaken in the 
aftermath of an earthquake, which shook northern California in 1989. The subjects in the study came 
from  three  different  geographic  regions,  and  they  were  each  affected  by  the  earthquake  to  a 
different extent. Interestingly, Neisser found that there were no significant correlations between 
emotional arousal and recall. In addition, the mean rated arousal of all the subjects in the study was 
not particularly high, a finding that Neisser attributed to the previous experience of Californian 
residents with earthquake incidents. Neisser (1997) subsequently asked what it was that made the 
earthquake so memorable for people close to the earthquake’s epicentre. He writes:  
“If the stress of the moment was not what made these experiences so memorable, the key 
factor  must  have  been  something  that  came  into  play  afterward.  In  my  view,  that 
something  made  its  appearance  as  soon  as  people  realized  that  this  had  been  no 
ordinary tremor. What did they do then? They started to talk about it. People who live 
through big events have many opportunities to describe their experiences, not just once, 
but over and over. They tell their stories to everyone they meet, and also to everyone who 
calls on the phone to see if they are all right. My hypothesis is that those rehearsals, the 
telling  and  retelling  of  each  individual's  earthquake  narrative,  are  what  made  the 
experience of this particular earthquake especially memorable.” (pg. 1701) 
What Neisser is suggesting here is that flashbulb memories occur for precisely the kind of reasons 
we have been discussing: people engage in conversation with other people, and this provides the 
kind of context in which optimal modes of mnemonic encoding are established.  
It is important to bear in mind here that this sort of socially-centred theorizing does not necessarily 
undermine  or  downplay  the  importance  of  biological  factors  in  terms  of  our  understanding  of 
memory phenomena. In the case of flashbulb memories, it may be perfectly true that the events we 
remember are those associated with strong levels of emotional arousal. And it may also be true that 
emotional arousal is playing an explanatorily significant role in our understanding of how flashbulb 
memories get formed. It may be, for example, that emotional arousal is still required to encourage 
people  to  seek  out  conversational  opportunities  and  to  make  particular  events  the  topic  of Extended Memory 
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protracted communicative exchanges. The point, for present purposes, is not that biological factors 
are irrelevant to our understanding of flashbulb memories; it is simply that we need to understand 
the kind of role they are playing in the cognitive processes associated with those memories. Thus, 
rather than emotional arousal playing an integral role in cognitive processing, what may be more 
likely, in the present case, is that emotion is serving as the instigating factor in a cognitive process 
that is then implemented in the social rather than the biological domain. Inasmuch as this is true, 
flashbulb memories may provide an example where it is the biological factors that serve as a causal 
influence  to  a  cognitive  process  that  is  comprised  of  information  processing  loops  that  extend 
beyond the biological realm. Typically, in discussions of extended cognition, the reverse is claimed to 
be true. Some philosophers have thus argued that the mistake made by extended mind theorists is 
to move from the mere causal coupling of some object or process to a cognitive agent, to the claim 
that the object or process is actually part of the agent’s cognitive apparatus. This has been dubbed 
the “coupling-constitution fallacy” (Adams & Aizawa, 2010), and it is typically reserved for cases 
where an external, non-biological factor is seen to exert a causal influence on neural processing. The 
case  of  flashbulb  memories  implies  the  same  fallacy  may  be  true  when  it  comes  to  our 
understanding  of  the  role  played  by  biological  factors  in  cases  of  environmentally-extended 
cognition. In this case, it is the biological factors that are playing a causal role (e.g. causing people to 
talk about certain events), and the cognitive process itself is constituted by information processing 
loops that draw on quite separate social and biological resources.   
Influencing What We Forget 
In addition to social relationships influencing our ability to remember particular events, it is also 
possible that they play an important role in determining what we forget. Whenever we talk about 
our past experiences with another person, we focus on some aspects of those experiences at the 
expense of others. Typically, we focus on those aspects of a situation that are personally relevant to 
us, or which are significant to the social context in which the past is discussed. This is important 
because research has shown that when we repeatedly recall some information at the expense of 
other, related information, then our access to the information that was not recalled is reduced. 
What seems to happen is that we effectively forget the non-recalled information. 
One empirical demonstration of this is provided by the phenomenon of retrieval-induced forgetting  
(e.g. Anderson et al., 1994). In the retrieval-induced forgetting paradigm, participants are initially 
exposed to a set of category cue-exemplar word pairs. For example, they might be exposed to a list 
containing words pairs such as ‘fruit-orange’ and ‘fruit-apple’. Subsequently, participants engage in 
repeated  directed  retrieval  practice  on  half  the  exemplars  from  half  of  the  category  cues.  For 
example, they might practice retrieving the ‘fruit-orange’ word pair, but not the ‘fruit-apple’ word 
pair. The way in which retrieval practice is performed is via category-stem recall, so participants are 
presented with a category-stem, such as ‘fruit-or____’ and asked to recall the exemplar word. In the 
test phase of the experiment, participants are presented with all the category cue words, and they 
are  asked  to  retrieve  as  many  of  the  exemplar  words  as  possible.  Results  using  this  paradigm 
consistently reveal that participants’ memory for exemplar words not associated with one of the 
category cues used in the second phase of the experiment is better than their memory for exemplar 
words that were associated with category cues but which were not recalled as part of the retrieval 
exercise. This is despite the fact that neither kind of word has been retrieved any more or less than 
the other. The phenomenon is referred to as retrieval-induced forgetting because it appears as Extended Memory 
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though the repeated retrieval of particular words in response to a category cue has resulted in other 
words that share the same category cue being forgotten. 
The  phenomenon  of  retrieval-induced  forgetting  has  also  been  observed  in  the  context  of 
autobiographical memories (Barnier et al., 2004). In one study, participants practiced the retrieval of 
some autobiographical memories at the expense of others, both of which shared the same category 
cue (for example, subjects might practice recalling one particular set of birthday memories rather 
than another set in response to the category cue of ‘birthday’). The result was the standard retrieval-
induced forgetting effect: a selective impairment of memories that were not practiced, but that 
were related to practiced memories via a shared category cue (see Barnier et al., 2004). 
So one way in which the content of our memories might be influenced by our social relationships is 
via the selective discussion of particular events and experiences at the expense of other, related 
events and experiences. Imagine that a couple occasionally visit the same restaurant together. In 
this case, the restaurant serves as a category cue that can be associated with any number of specific 
episodic memories. The memory the couple have of their previous visits to the restaurant can now 
be influenced by the selective discussion of some particular visits at the expense of others. Perhaps 
one member of the couple will seek to recount the events of one particular visit for reasons that are 
particular to her, and this will serve as the basis for joint reminiscences of the evening together – the 
food that was eaten, the topics of conversation, and so on. This act of selective remembering not 
only makes the couple’s memory of that particular evening more memorable, it also (according to 
the notion of retrieval-induced forgetting) makes the details of evenings that were not recalled less 
accessible. In this way, one or both members of the couple can effectively influence the memories 
that are jointly held by both members (with perhaps important implications for how each member 
of the couple thinks the relationship is progressing!). As Barnier et al (2004) note, the notion of 
retrieval-induced forgetting might have important implications for how we understand the way in 
which individuals actively construct their access to the past:  
“The conditions modelled by RIF [retrieval-induced forgetting] might be one way that 
individuals  shape  their  life  story  and  manage  unwanted  memories.  By  rehearsing 
memories that support a positive rather than negative, ordered rather than disordered, 
life story, they may become highly accessible. Each time these memories are accessed 
they  may  reinforce  the  inhibition  of  competing,  undesirable  autobiographical 
knowledge.” (pg. 473). 
What the present discussion adds to this notion is that our memories of the past may sometimes be 
the result of social forces and factors as opposed to merely individual concerns. The people that we 
interact with may structure our discussions about the past in such a way that the content of our 
memories says just as much about their interests, needs, and goals as it does our own. The past, in 
essence, may be the product of a delicate interplay between biologically-based processes on the one 
hand and the dynamics of socially-based information processing on the other.   
Memories, Social Networks and the Self 
The memories we hold about the past, both individually and collectively, are believed to play a 
crucial role in our notions of who and what we are. That is, our memories play an important role in 
determining our sense of personal identity. At the individual level, considerable attention has been 
devoted to an understanding of the bidirectional relationships between our memories and our sense Extended Memory 
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of self. Conway (2005), for example, emphasizes the interconnectedness of self and memory in the 
context  of  his  self-memory  system.  Conway  proposes  that  our  autobiographical  memories 
contribute to our knowledge about who we are, and this in turn “constrains what the self is, has 
been and can be” (pg. 594.) 
Inasmuch as our individual memories are the product of forces and factors that operate at the social 
level, it is possible to begin to see how social considerations play a role in influencing our sense of 
who we are. As with Conway’s theory, the relationship between self and the socially distributed 
processes  that  influence  our  memories  are  likely  to  be  bidirectional  in  nature,  with  our  social 
relationships influencing what we remember, and our sense of who we are influencing both the 
content and the form of the socially-distributed mnemonic processes that take place. What this 
leaves  us  with  is  the  possibility  that  the  mechanisms  governing  our  sense  of  self  are  partly 
determined  by  the  nature  of  our  social  interactions.  By  seeing  at  least  some  of  our  memory 
processes as extended to the social domain, we can see that social actors emerge as an important 
element of those forces and factors that help to make us what we are
7.  
Collaborative Recall 
Consider the following exchange (taken from Sutton et al (2010)) between a husband and wife 
discussing their honeymoon together, some 40 years previously. In this particular exchange, the 
couple are trying to recall the name of a show they both attended. 
Wife: And we went to two shows. Can you remember what they were called? 
Husband: We did. One was a musical, or were they both? I don’t... no... one... 
W: John Hanson was in it. 
H: Desert Song. 
W: Desert Song, that’s it, I couldn’t remember what it was called, but yes, I 
knew John Hanson was in it. 
H: Yes. 
This discussion is quite typical of our attempts to recall some piece of shared information in social 
contexts, and it highlights something quite important about the nature of collaborative recall. Notice 
that the name of the show is successfully recalled as the result of cross-cuing between the couple. 
One person provides a cue, which by itself is inadequate to prompt the recall of desired information 
in either person. However, the cue does provide the basis for retrieval of another cue that is then 
fed  back  to  the  original  person,  and  so  on.  This  iterative  cycle  of  engagement  supports  the 
progressive generation and elaboration of cues until eventually the conditions for one or other 
person  to  successfully  recall  the  information  are  established.  In  this  sense,  it  is  the  interaction 
between the individuals that provides the basis for recall. Absent the social interaction and the 
memory may be inaccessible. In fact, it may be largely impossible (or at least very difficult) for an 
individual, acting by themselves, to recall the details of a distant shared experience without the kind 
                                                           
7  This  may,  of  course,  also  extend  to  notions  of  collective  memory  and  group  identity.  Inasmuch  as  our 
collective memories of shared experiences are determined by the dynamics of our social interaction, then our 
sense of who we are as a group – our group identity – may be influenced as much by socially-distributed 
memory processes as by intra-individual memory processes. Like the notion of personal identity, it is likely that 
the relationship between group identify and socially-extended memory is a bidirectional one: group identity 
influences the dynamics of socially-extended memory processes, and these in turn influence the collective 
memories that serve as the backdrop to group identity. Extended Memory 
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of mnemonic scaffolding provided by other people. In the example above, the couple initially only 
have very vague memories of the past event – the wife can remember the number of shows they 
went to, but the husband is unsure as to what kind of shows these were. Functioning by themselves, 
it seems unlikely that the recall of a specific piece of information – the name of one of the shows – 
would  be  very  accessible.  At  the  very  least,  each  individual  would  need  to  generate  a  lot  of 
additional retrieval cues, which may or may not be possible. And yet working together, the name of 
the  show  is  successfully  recalled  within  a  very  short  space  of  time.  Clearly,  the  couple,  in  this 
example, had shared memories of the past; however, access to those memories did not come about 
as  a  result  of  purely  individual  efforts  –  the  couple  worked  together  to  establish  the  kind  of 
informational conditions under which their respective bio-memories were most accessible. 
What this example hopefully illustrates is that social interaction can sometimes play a productive 
role in enabling us to access specific memories. Just as when we repeatedly revisit aspects of the 
past through joint reminiscences, thereby engaging in elaborative rehearsal, social forces are here 
working to exert a positive influence on memory; they are supporting our access to the past in a way 
that might not be easily reproducible by other means. Without the kind of support provided by 
social interaction, many aspects of our past lives might forever be inaccessible to us. Dispense with 
long-standing social connections that have endured across many shared experiences together, and 
we potentially lose contact with parts our lives through which those connections have endured. 
Thus, while it might not seem that social networks have much to say about the content of our 
memories and the form of our remembering, we can see from this discussion that social networks 
can function in an important way to preserve access to our past lives. On this view, our social ties 
serve as more than bonds of social affiliation in the present, they also provide important linkages to 
our shared past together
8.  
In the case of collaborative recall we see a process that is clearly social in nature, in the sense that it 
involves the cooperation of two or more human agents. Is this process a fitting candidate for a case 
of socially-extended cognition? One way of assessing this is to draw on what Clark and Chalmers 
(1998) refer to as the parity principle. The parity principle states that: 
“…if, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it 
to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting it is part of the cognitive 
system, then that part of the world is (for that time) part of the cognitive process.” (Clark 
& Chalmers, 1998) 
The question we can now ask ourselves is if the process of collaborative recall were to take place in 
the head, would we regard this a cognitive process – as a process concerned with the retrieval of 
information stored in memory? On my view, this would be an acceptable conclusion. What we see in 
the case of collaborative recall are iterative cycles of information flow and influence that support the 
                                                           
8 Perhaps this view of social bonds provides some insight into why the loss of an important friend or romantic 
partner is so personally significant. When long-standing social relationships are permanently broken, there is 
an important sense in which our access to past events and experiences is weakened. Our memories of those 
parts of the past we shared may no longer be as accessible as they once were, and, in the worst case, they may 
be forever irretrievable...essentially forgotten. Inasmuch as our memories make us who we are – inasmuch as 
they provide with a sense of our identity – then the dissolution of important social bonds and connections has 
potentially significant repercussions for our sense of who and what we are as individuals. When important 
friends and partners leave, an important part of who we are goes with them. Extended Memory 
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progressive creation, elaboration and structuring of cues in a way that ultimately leads to the recall 
of the target memory. As a form of cognitive process related to the retrieval of information from 
long-term memory, this seems perfectly acceptable, and it may even be a process that is not terribly 
far removed from what happens in the case of individual, biologically-based retrieval. What emerges 
from this discussion is a view of our social networks as potentially playing the same role in our 
memory processes as those implemented by the biological networks of the brain. Disrupt the social 
networks in some way and the consequences for memory may be akin to those seen in cases of 
neurological trauma.  
The case of collaborative recall creates a picture of the mind that is empowered by its reliance on 
socially-distributed forms of information processing. At the same time, however, it also creates a 
picture of the mind that is perhaps more vulnerable than what we see in the case of individual 
(biologically-based) recall. The profligate extension of our cognitive machinery into the world seems 
to bring definite advantages, but it also seems to entail certain risks. In particular, the form of our 
cognitive processing now seems vulnerable to the vagaries of our social environments. The potential 
for disruption, distortion and deliberate subversion of our cognitive processing routines seems a 
distinct possibility, and it is not clear how well we can safeguard ourselves against these malign 
influences. This is something that takes us back to the beginning of this section and the concerns of 
those who see social influence as a potentially contaminative influence on memory. In the next 
section,  I  focus  on  a  specific  phenomenon  that  seems  to  call  into  question  the  value  of  social 
influence when it comes to our remembrances of the past.   
Social Contagion 
The cases of social influence discussed so far – the social mediation of long-term memory and the 
case of collaborative recall – portray a largely positive picture of how social forces and factors can 
contribute  to  human  memory.  In  these  cases,  social  processes  were  seen  as  enhancing  or 
augmenting our mnemonic capabilities. However, not all forms of social influence are necessarily 
cast in such a positive light. One set of findings that motivates a more negative perspective of social 
influence comes from, so-called, social contagion or memory conformity studies (Gabbert et al., 
2003; Meade & Roediger, 2002; Roediger et al., 2001). In these studies, the primary focus of interest 
is the way in which the presence of other individuals can affect the recall of previously encountered 
information. For example, in a study by Roediger et al (2001), people were placed in pairs (one of 
whom  was  a  confederate  of  the  experimenter).  They  were  then  asked  to  watch  a  slideshow 
depicting six common household scenes (e.g. a kitchen), each containing a variety of objects. In a 
subsequent recall phase, the two subjects were each asked to recall six items from the scenes that 
they had seen. However, the aim of the confederate at this stage of the experiment was to introduce 
items that had not been seen in the scenes. The issue addressed by Roediger et al (2001) was the 
extent  to which  the  items  introduced  by  the  confederate  would  lead  to  the  formation  of  false 
memories in the experimental subject. Would the experimental subjects, after hearing the items 
introduced by the confederate, incorporate these items into their own memory of the scenes they 
had witnessed? Roediger et al (2001) tested this in a third stage of the experiment. In this phase, the 
experimental subject was asked to recall as many items as possible from the six scenes without the 
presence of the confederate.  
What Roediger et al (2001) discovered was that experimental subjects, exposed to the erroneous 
items during the collaborative recall phase, were more likely to recall these items in the final recall Extended Memory 
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stage of the experiment. On the basis of these results, Roediger et al (2001) concluded that “subjects 
incorporated the confederates’ memories into their own recollections”; the subjects’ memories of 
the scenes they had witnessed had been effectively infected with the false memories suggested by 
the confederate.  
At first blush, these experimental results seem consistent with a view that has become increasingly 
prevalent in the psychology of memory. This view emphasizes the vulnerability of our memories to 
the malign forces of social influence. As Elizabeth Loftus (1997) writes, “misinformation has the 
potential for invading our memories when we talk to other people” (pg. 51). The view thus regards 
social  influence  as  compromising  our  ability  to  accurately  recall  past  events  and  as  potentially 
leading to the formation of false memories. The very name given to Roediger et al’s experimental 
paradigm  –  social  contagion  –  emphasizes  the  idea  of  social  influence  as  something  that  is 
contaminative and subversive – of something that we should be highly circumspect about...or avoid 
altogether. 
This negative perspective, however, is not necessarily vindicated by the results of false memory 
research. For a start, Roediger et al (2001) note that, in their experiment, experimental subjects 
would incorporate correct as well as incorrect items in their final recall list. In other words, when the 
confederate  reported  items  that  were  actually  present  in  the  six  scenes,  experimental  subjects 
showed a tendency to ‘incorporate’ these correct items into their memories as well as the incorrect 
ones. This particular finding does not suggest a socially-mediated disruption to recall capabilities, so 
much as a socially-mediated improvement in recall capabilities.  
Thus,  although  the  results  of  social  contagion  studies  may  be  seen  as  revealing  a  notable 
shortcoming of our memories – namely their susceptibility to socially-mediated contamination – 
they  may  also  reveal  something  of  adaptive  significance.  Perhaps  in  many  ecologically  realistic 
situations (ones devoid of contrived, Machiavellian experimental setups) it does benefit us to make 
our memories susceptible to forms of social influence. In situations where we share our experiences 
with others, it may make little sense to overload our individual biological brains with the task of 
encoding all the details of a specific situation. Instead, it may make much more sense to distribute 
the encoding task across the elements of our social network – to  share the burden of forming 
memories in the full knowledge that we can later rely on our social connections to facilitate our 
subsequent  recall.  If,  in  that  situation,  we  discover  that  another’s  recollections  of  the  past  are 
different from our own, or if they recall aspects of a situation in more detail than we do, then it may 
make perfect sense for us to adjust our own memories in light of the information they provide. In 
this case, the susceptibility of our memories to social influence seems like a perfectly good thing: it 
enables us to check and, if necessary, modify our memories in light of the experiences of others.  
This potentially adaptive role for socially-malleable memory is recognized by a number of writers, 
including those who work in the area of false memory research. Roediger et al (2001), for example, 
write that: 
“If  it  is  generally  adaptive  for  people  to  update  their  memories  based  on  other’s 
recollections of the same events, then the occasional negative effects – creating false 
memories  through  erroneous  reports  –  become  understandable  as  an  inevitable 
consequence of a normally adaptive process.” (Roediger et al., 2001, pg. 370) Extended Memory 
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Of course, none of this precludes the possibility that our socially-informed memories are necessarily 
accurate representations of the past. We can obviously be misled into forming false memories if the 
information provided by a social acquaintance is deliberately or accidentally fallacious. Two factors 
may guard against this in real-world situations. The first is that we may be more inclined to modify 
our memories when confronted with a greater number of consistent recollections. Thus, if one 
person’s recollections of the past are at odds with the recollections of lots of other individuals, then 
it is possible that that person’s recollections of the past are in error and require revision. In this case, 
it would make sense to converge on a common, consensual representation of the past. A second 
safeguard against false memories, this time resulting from attempts at social deception, may be to 
bias our susceptibility in favour of those we trust. Some empirical evidence in support of this has 
been provided by French et al (2008). Their results suggests that intimacy may be an important 
predictor  of  social  contagion.  They  write  that  people  are  “even  more  susceptible  to  memory 
distortion when someone they know provides the misleading information” (pg. 271). 
The preceding discussion touches on an important point in memory research. It is that once we take 
a given capability out of its proper social, ecological and evolutionary context, then many aspects of 
human memory can start to seem like design flaws or information processing shortcomings. This is 
especially so when we lose sight of the kind of features that may have characterized our ancestral 
physical and social environments, and against which our present-day cognitive capabilities may have 
taken shape. Take, for the instance, the idea, mooted above, that the social malleability of our 
memories may be an adaptive strategy to avoid the cognitive processing overhead associated with 
the detailed encoding of all aspects of an experienced event or situation. Such an approach seems 
like a sensible strategy for a social animal to pursue. Given limited cognitive resources, it benefits the 
individual to distribute the cognitive cost of encoding a situation and rely on a combination of 
relatively sparse individual encodings and the mechanisms of socially-distributed remembering (e.g. 
collaborative recall) in order to support later recall. If, during subsequent recall, an individual is 
exposed to new information about the situation that they did not encode, it is probably helpful, at 
that later stage, to incorporate the new information into their own memories of the situation.  
Of course, one might argue that such claims are implausible for a number of reasons. Firstly, our 
social relationships seldom seem stable enough for us to delegate encoding and recall to them in the 
way suggested. Secondly, many of the situations where memory is called into action (e.g. revising for 
an exam) are not necessarily ones that we experience as a socially-shared activity. In many cases, 
activities that draw heavily on memory, like studying, are often insular ones that we undertake 
alone. Thirdly, to distribute encoding and recall to other people seems to make us unnecessarily 
vulnerable to deception and the vagaries of others’ recall capabilities. These are obviously all valid 
concerns;  however,  they  are  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  context  in  which  our  memory 
capacities  evolved  resembles  that  in  which  we  find  ourselves  today.  This  assumption  is  not 
necessarily valid. The social networks of our hominid ancestors 100,000 years ago may have been 
very different to those of today. In all likelihood, they would have been much more stable, with 
certain individuals providing a persistent social presence throughout the entire course of someone’s 
life. In addition, it is likely that the kind of situations in which memory was called into service on the 
African  savannah  were  profoundly  different  from  those  of  the  modern  day.  In  all  likelihood, 
situations that called for individual memory to function in isolation from the social realm would have 
been rare. Finally, regarding the risk of deliberate or accidental misinformation, this is an inevitable 
risk that comes with social malleable forms of memory. However, we can question whether either Extended Memory 
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the risk of deception/misinformation or the severity of its consequences was as significant for our 
hominid ancestors as it apparently is in the present day. It may well have been the case, for example, 
that the stability of social networks encouraged individuals to become more trustworthy (at the very 
least  it  afforded  the  possibility  of  detecting  and  isolating  those  who  could  not  be  trusted). 
Furthermore, it is not necessarily clear what the consequences of misinformation would have been. 
Would fidelity of memory have been as important for our ancestors as it is today, or is the demand 
for accuracy something of relatively recent origin: something that appeared once we actually had a 
reliable means of checking our memories against pictorial and orthographic representations of the 
past (see below for more on this)?
 It is difficult to say for sure; however, fidelity is not necessarily the 
only  selective  pressure  that  sculpted  our  memory  capabilities.  The  ability  to  form  common, 
consensual representations of the past (collective memories) may have been important independent 
of the actual veracity of those representations. Such collective memories may fulfil a number of 
important social functions. For example, they may promote social cohesion and solidarity, and they 
may provide the basis for the formation of group identities. Inasmuch as this is true, then perhaps 
the relative benefit of converging on a common, collective representation of the past outweighed 
those associated with maintaining an accurate, but socially discrepant representation of past events 
and situations
9.       
What I have tried to do in this section is show how a seemingly negative aspect of our mnemonic 
functioning – social contagion – can be reinterpreted in a more positive light once we begin to 
situate memory in its proper social, ecological and evolutionary context. The human mind probably 
evolved against a rich backdrop of social forces and factors, and not all of these forces and factors 
were  necessarily  benign  (e.g.  Byrne  &  Whiten,  1988).  No  doubt  the  human  mind  includes 
adaptations to protect itself from the exigencies of the social environment (e.g. the potential for 
social deception and manipulation); however, in all likelihood it also includes adaptations to exploit 
the features of those environments. One of those features is the presence of other minds, and the 
resources of those minds are things that can be factored deep into our own cognitive processing 
routines and information processing strategies. In general, evolutionary processes do not care about 
the material nature of the resources that are available to fulfil some function; they only care about 
how those resources can be exploited to serve adaptive outcomes. Artificial evolutionary processes 
attest to the variety of ways in which seemingly irrelevant forces and factors may be co-opted into a 
design solution. Thus, in using genetic algorithms to evolve real electronic circuits, Bird and Layzell 
(2002) managed to create an ‘oscillator circuit’ whose systemic oscillatory behaviour was parasitic 
on the radio signals being generated from a nearby computer. In essence, the evolving circuit had 
generated the correct oscillatory behaviour, but it had done so not by creating a genuine oscillator 
circuit;  it  had  solved  the  problem  by  evolving  radio  reception  capabilities  and  relaying  the 
oscillations created by nearby circuits. Such phenomena are a common feature of many evolutionary 
processes. Thompson et al (1996) thus argue that during the evolution of electronic circuitry: 
                                                           
9 In addition to social contagion, some of the other processes discussed in this section may also support 
convergence towards common, collective memories. Thus, in their discussion of how shared memories are 
created in conversation, Hirst and Echterhoff (2008) comment that socially shared retrieval-induced forgetting 
may be one of the means by which ‘individual memories converge onto a unified and stable rendering of the 
past’  (pg.  203).  As  mentioned  above,  such  convergence  may  serve  important  social  functions,  such  as 
supporting social cohesion and solidarity. Extended Memory 
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“…it can be expected that all the detailed physics of the hardware will be brought to 
bear  on  the  problem  at  hand:  time  delays,  parasitic  capacitances  cross-talk,  meta-
stability constraints and other low-level characteristics might all be used in generating 
the evolved behaviour.” (pg. 21) 
What we begin to see, therefore, is that for any given purpose, evolution may often assemble 
solutions that pay scant regard to the actual material resources that are used to solve a particular 
problem. Inasmuch as the presence of others was a reliable element of our evolutionary past, then it 
is likely that many of our biologically-based processing routines will be sensitized to the exploitation 
of that presence. In this sense, it seems perfectly possible that the human brain would have opted 
for a strategy that relied on socially-distributed encodings and subsequent collaborative recall in 
order  to  alleviate  itself  of  some  of  the  cognitive  load  associated  with  the  formation  of  highly 
accurate, detailed representations. The social contagion phenomenon may then be seen as a means 
by which our initially sparse encodings are supplemented with whatever details of a past event or 
situation  are  deemed  significant  enough  (or  important)  enough  to  discuss.  On  this  view,  social 
contagion emerges as a perfectly normal feature of human memory, originating from our adaptive 
tendency to rely on the elements of our social network as a means of distributing the cognitive effort 
associated with mnemonic encoding. 
Intermission: Lennie’s Loss 
Lennie, the main protagonist in the movie Memento, is, if you recall, an individual with a damaged 
mind. The injury sustained by Lennie during the attack on his wife means that he can no longer form 
new  long-term  memories.  This  leaves  him  with  a  number  of  impairments,  some  of  which  he 
attempts to remedy by relying on his system of hand-written notes, annotated photos and body 
tattoos. Lennie’s bio-cognitive machinery is clearly damaged as a result of his injury, but what does 
this really mean in terms of the impairments that Lennie suffers? What exactly is it that Lennie has 
lost? 
Perhaps  most  significantly,  given  Lennie’s  objectives  in  the  movie,  Lennie  has  lost  an  ability  to 
efficiently  piece  together  a  temporally  distributed  body  of  facts  in  order  to  arrive  at  a  correct 
understanding of some particular state-of-affairs. Lennie’s main aim in the movie, remember, is to 
solve the mystery of his wife’s murder, track down her killer and take his revenge. So, from Lennie’s 
perspective, perhaps the most significant impact of his memory impairment relates to his inability to 
encode and retrieve facts relevant to the case. He has essentially lost an ability to ‘connect the dots’, 
to establish a network of relationships between otherwise disparate pieces of information in a way 
that progressively leads him to develop a better understanding of the mystery surrounding his wife’s 
death.  
In fact, however, there is no evidence from the movie that Lennie does see this particular kind of 
impairment as significant. Lennie believes in his system, and in fact he sees it as being more reliable 
than bio-memory. In addition, it is not clear that Lennie is in fact actually impaired when it comes to 
the assimilation, processing and utilization of facts. Lennie can store information, and he can use 
that information to guide his thought and action in goal-appropriate ways. A casual viewing of the 
movie might lead to the conclusion that, as the philosopher Joseph Levine (2009) sees it, “Leonard is 
totally clueless” (pg. 46). But to come to this conclusion is, I think, to miss something important 
about the movie. Lennie follows the facts of the case exactly where they lead him, and, at the end of Extended Memory 
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the movie, they result in him killing the person whom he actually believes (justifiably so) to be his 
wife’s killer. The notion that Lennie is “clueless” presumably stems from the fact that Lennie ends 
up
10 killing Teddy,  someone who seems to have provided a degree of support and friendship to 
Lennie. Teddy is unlikely to have murdered Lennie’s wife, so Lennie seems to have failed in his quest, 
and the roots of that failure seem to lie squarely at the feet of his system of external mnemonic 
artefacts.  
Or does it? Do Lennie and his system really fail? We learn at the very end of the movie that things 
aren’t quite as they had appeared to be. In fact, Lennie sets himself up to kill Teddy by manipulating 
the contents of his own external memory. Lennie relies on two things in order to accomplish this 
virtuoso display of self-deception. The first of these is that he accepts, without question, whatever 
information his external memory makes available to him. Just like the contents of his own bio-
memory, Lennie trusts the contents of his external memory. The second thing that Lennie relies on is 
the fact that he won’t be able to recall why information exists in his external memory. He won’t, in 
other words, be able to remember the reason why he decided to store certain facts. Is it because 
those facts are important to the case, or is it because his past self has desires and intentions that are 
at odds with what his current self wants to do? Lennie just doesn’t know. He can’t appreciate the 
importance or the purpose of the information that is arrayed around him. 
Both of these points highlight the significance of a key thematic element in Memento; in fact, maybe 
it is the most important theme of the whole movie. It is the theme of trust. Obviously, the nature of 
Lennie’s injury makes him vulnerable to social manipulation and deception, but this vulnerability 
isn’t necessarily an indication of the integrity of his external memory system. In fact, Lennie’s system 
of storing and using external resources is relatively well-protected against at least some forms of 
social subversion and malicious tampering. For example, Lennie’s recognition of his own handwriting 
serves to convince him that he is the originator of whatever is contained in his notes. Furthermore, it 
is difficult to see how Lennie could have failed to unequivocally endorse the information provided by 
his tattoos at the point they were created  (especially since some of the tattoos were created by 
Lennie himself). It is also unlikely that the tattoos Lennie does have could easily have been edited 
without him being aware of it. As such, direct forms of social interference with the contents of 
Lennie’s external memory are not necessarily a problem. What is a problem, however, is Lennie’s 
ability to gauge the intentions of those around him. Practically everyone in the movie manipulates 
Lennie to their own ends. Lennie is acutely aware of this vulnerability – in fact, he has a tattoo on his 
lower  left  ribcage,  which  reads  “DON’T  TRUST”.  The  irony  here  is  that  despite  recognizing  his 
vulnerability,  there  is  someone  who  Lennie  does trust  implicitly:  himself.  Ultimately,  this  is  the 
source of his undoing. The trust that Lennie places in himself, and the resulting faith he places in the 
facts that he has created, ultimately lead him to manipulate himself to his own ends. 
So what emerges from the movie is a sense that Lennie’s disability manifests itself in particular and 
perhaps unexpected ways. His ability to store and recall important factual information – his semantic 
memory, we might say – is preserved at least to some extent by virtue of his extended memory 
system. However, his ability to cope effectively with inter-personal relationships, and his ability to 
navigate the turbid, murky waters of the self is a deficit that is not remedied by the system he 
                                                           
10 Because of the narrative structure of the movie, Lennie actually kills Teddy at the beginning of the movie. If 
the narrative elements of the movie were to be arranged in a chronologically linear sequence, the scene where 
Teddy is killed by Lennie would occur right at the end of the movie. Extended Memory 
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employs. In fact, it is precisely this feature of his extended memory that ultimately exacerbates his 
vulnerability to (social
11) deception. “MEMORY IS TREACHERY”, reads one of Lennie’s tattoos. How 
true! It is probably the only one of Lennie’s extended memories that is. 
There is another aspect of Lennie’s predicament that highlights the nature of his loss. During a 
particularly poignant scene in the movie, we find Lennie alone at night in a parking lot, huddled over 
a  small  fire  into  which  he  throws  the  few  remaining  items  he  has  of  his  wife’s  belongings:  a 
hairbrush, a well-worn book, and a teddy. This act of destruction reflects an attempt by Lennie to rid 
himself of the memory of his wife’s loss. By destroying the last few mementos of his wife, he hopes 
to rid himself of the sense of grief he feels. Ultimately, of course, this is a pointless exercise. Lennie’s 
inability to lay down new memories means that his most enduring memories are those associated 
with his wife...and her death. In the absence of any new memories, Lennie has no sense of the 
passage of time, and no ability to recover from the emotional trauma of his wife’s loss. “How am I 
supposed to heal if I can't...feel time?”, asks Lennie. This is Lennie’s main problem, and it is the 
ultimate irony of the movie. We might initially be led to think that Lennie’s loss is simply a matter of 
not being able to remember things. But we would be wrong. Lennie’s main problem in the movie, 
the source of all of his pain, the reason for his murderous intent, and the basis for his, ultimately 
misdirected,  sanguineous  actions,  lie  not  in  his  inability  to  remember;  his  main  problem  is  his 
inability to forget.  
Memory Technologies: Function, Features and Cognitive Extension 
The  increasing  availability  of  wearable  computing  devices  and  ubiquitous  information  networks 
heralds  new  opportunities  for  the  design  and  development  of  technologies  to  support  human 
memory. Indeed, there are a number of technologies that are already being investigated for their 
memory-enhancing properties. These include wearable devices such as memory glasses to support 
semantic memory (DeVaul et al., 2005), sensor devices to support episodic memory (Berry et al., 
2007;  Hodges  et  al., 2006),  and  alerting  devices  to  support  prospective memory  (Wilson  et  al., 
2001)
12. There are also  efforts underway to explore the potential of life -logging technologies and 
semantic modes of information representation to support  forms of autobiographical memory and 
the compilation of autobiographical knowledge bases (O'Hara et al., 2009). All of these technologies 
aim to capitalize on recent advances in electronic devices and the Web in order to improve aspects 
of human memory function. 
When we think about technological innovation, it is common to think about the purpose or function 
of the technology. What should the technology do? What functions should it serve? And when it 
comes to the design and development of memory technologies, the answer to this question seems 
                                                           
11 There is a side issue here concerning the nature of Lennie’s act of self-deception. Does this constitute a true 
form of self-deception, or is it rather a case of social manipulation? Much depends here on whether we regard 
Lennie as the same person throughout the entire movie, or whether we regard Lennie as essentially a series of 
different  people.  These  are  questions  of  identity  and  they  lie  beyond  the  scope  of  the  current  paper. 
Nevertheless,  on  a  personal  level,  it  does  feel  as  though  the  Lennie  who  wholeheartedly  believes  (albeit 
falsely) that Teddy is the killer is a different person from the Lennie who does not believe that Teddy is the 
killer, but who sets himself up to believe that such is the case in the future. Inasmuch as Lennie has a different 
identity at different points in the movie, it is easy to see how Lennie’s act of self-deception could easily be 
construed as a case of social manipulation.  
12 These technologies obviously do not include a range of pharmacological interventions that could be used to 
enhance memory (see Lynch, 2002). Extended Memory 
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relatively straightforward: memory technologies should help us remember things better. Given our 
intuitions about what memory is, it seems relatively clear that memory technologies should function 
so as to improve our ability to recall past experiences and previously encountered facts. What else 
could such technologies possibly be used for?  
Unfortunately,  our  intuitions  about  what  memory  technologies  should  do  is  complicated  by  a 
number of factors. In general, a new cognitive technology should aim to do one of three of things: 1) 
it should aim to redress or remedy an apparent shortcoming or limitation of an existing capability, 2) 
it should aim to augment an existing capability, or 3) it should aim to install new kinds of capabilities. 
Thus, when it comes to memory technologies, we might imagine them doing one or more of the 
following: 
1.  Addressing  an  apparent  limitation  of  our  existing  mnemonic  capabilities;  for  example, 
attenuating our tendency to forget things, or addressing our inability to keep more than a 
certain number of things in working memory at the same time. 
2.  Improving  on  our  existing  mnemonic  capabilities,  such  as  enabling  us  to  recall  more 
information with greater accuracy and fidelity. 
3.  Providing new kinds of mnemonic capability; for example, storing the totality of human 
knowledge in semantic memory. 
The  problem  with this  simple  conception of what  memory  technologies  should  do  is  threefold. 
Firstly, psychologists have distinguished many different types of memory (e.g. semantic memory, 
episodic memory, autobiographical memory, procedural memory, prospective memory, and so on), 
and these types of memory differ (among other things) in terms of the kind of information that is 
retrieved and the purpose to which the retrieved information is put. As a result, it is difficult to come 
up with generalized statements as to the function of memory technologies. In general, memory 
technologies will target a specific kind of memory, and their functionality will vary accordingly. A 
second and potentially more significant problem is that it is not always clear that a deficiency or 
shortcoming in an aspect of our cognitive profile really is a weakness that needs to be remedied. 
Sometimes, what seems like an apparent shortcoming in cognitive processing can actually play an 
unanticipated adaptive role in our overall cognitive functioning, especially when such features are 
seen as operating with a broader developmental and social context. Thirdly, it is not necessarily clear 
that  the  true  function  of  memory  (as  seen  in  either  its  historical,  evolutionary  or  modern-day 
context) is one of accurate recall. While truth may be normative for some types of memory (e.g. 
semantic  memory),  this  may  not  apply  to  all  types  of  memory.  In  fact,  when  it  comes  to 
autobiographical  memory,  for  example,  a  number  of  memory  researchers  have  been  keen  to 
emphasize  the  primacy  of  other  types  of  function;  for  example,  social,  psychodynamic  and 
communicative functions.  
In addition to these considerations, there is also the issue of whether a memory technology should 
aim to emulate aspects of bio-memory function or replicate bio-memory phenomena. This issue 
actually subsumes a perplexing range of issues, such as whether a memory technology should seek 
to  emulate  the  representational  and  computational  features  of  bio-memory  (e.g.  distributed, 
superpositional modes of information encoding) and whether it should exhibit the same kind of 
phenomena as those seen in the case of bio-memory (e.g. the generation effect). Extended Memory 
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In this section, I will attempt to answer at least some of these questions, or at least make them 
somewhat more intelligible. I first discuss the issue of correcting or addressing what seem like design 
flaws in our bio-memory systems. I focus, in particular, on our tendency to forget and the processing 
limitations  of  working  memory.  In  the  following  section,  I  focus  on  the  normativity  of  truth  in 
memory technology design. Here I discuss to what extent memory technologies should support the 
accurate recall of previously encountered information. Finally, I explore the extent to which memory 
technologies should seek to emulate the features and characteristics of the bio-memory system. 
Addressing Nature’s Shortcomings 
As a set of processes that enable us to recall information from the past, human memory shows an 
amazing mix of both strengths and weaknesses. Its strengths are evident whenever we are able to 
reflect on (enjoyable) events from the distant past, or whenever we are to recall with ease a set of 
well-rehearsed facts. It’s weaknesses, however, are all too obvious. They include, most notably, the 
susceptibility  of  our  memories  to  decay,  our  tendency  to  forget  seemingly  important  pieces  of 
information, the susceptibility of our memories to social contagion (Loftus, 1997; Roediger et al., 
2001), and the processing limitations associated with some aspects of our memory system (e.g. 
working memory capacity). In light of these weaknesses, it seems plausible that one of the aims for 
memory  technology  development  would  be  to  address  these  weaknesses  –  to  remedy  the 
shortcomings that biology has bestowed upon us.  
The problem with this development goal is that it is far from clear that the apparent weaknesses of 
bio-memory really are the kinds of things that should be the target of technological innovation. Take 
forgetting, for example. Our tendency to forget is undoubtedly a common source of frustration in 
many  situations.  However,  to  see  forgetting  as  uniformly  negative  is  to overlook  its  potentially 
adaptive role in enabling us to rid ourselves of irrelevant, redundant or damaging information. In 
recent years, human memory researchers have begun to appreciate the important, adaptive role of 
forgetting in our everyday behaviour. Forgetting may, for example, act as an updating mechanism 
that reduces the impact of past, irrelevant experience on current, relevant activity (Bjork, 1989). 
Forgetting may also enable us to avoid contact with aspects of the past that are psychologically and 
emotionally damaging (consider, for example, the way in which Lennie’s inability to forget made it 
impossible  for  him  to  come  to  terms  with  his  wife’s  loss).  Thus,  rather  than  see  forgetting  as 
evidence of a cognitive failure – as a shortcoming of a cognitive system that was designed to do 
something  else  –  it  may  be  worth  considering  the  possibility  that  forgetting  is  just  as  much  a 
functional part of our memory systems as our ability to remember things. Inasmuch as this is the 
case, we should perhaps be somewhat circumspect of technological interventions that strive to 
eliminate forgetting from our cognitive repertoire. Indeed, when it comes to technology design, 
theorists have often highlighted the potential value of forgetting mechanisms in managing the vast 
quantities of information made available by a combination of cheap computer memory and the 
advent  of  global  information  networks  (Morris  et  al.,  2006;  O'Hara  et  al.,  2006a).  Forgetting 
capabilities  might  be  especially  useful  if  memory  devices  countenance  information  storage 
techniques that are based on discrete, symbolic encodings (as is currently the case with computer 
memory),  as  opposed  to  the  distributed,  superpositional  encoding  techniques  of  bio-memory. 
Symbolic  modes  of  information  storage  typically  require  a  greater  number  of  representational 
resources to store new information, and this has implications for the amount of information that can 
ultimately be stored, as well the efficiency of the search and retrieval processes that operate over 
the stored information.   Extended Memory 
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What about the notion that some aspects of our memory system suffer from information processing 
limitations that could be obviated by technological interventions? One potentially important target 
here  is  working  memory,  which  has  been  shown  to  be  restricted  in  terms  of  the  amount  of 
information it can handle at any particular point in time (Baddeley et al., 2009, chapter 3). We have 
already seen one way in which such processing constraints may be dealt with in the case of human 
agents  solving  long  multiplication  problems  by  resorting  to  pen  and  paper  solutions.  Are  there 
perhaps  other  ways  in which  technologies  could  be  developed  to  expand  our  working  memory 
capacities across a greater variety of task domains? 
Before we start to think about potential answers to this question, it is worth considering the implicit 
assumption on which this question is based. The assumption is that the processing limitations of 
working memory really do constitute something of a design limitation – some sort of functional 
shortcoming, overlooked by biological evolution, which is now in need of effective remediation by 
the trenchant ingenuity of technology designers. It is far from clear, however, that the processing 
characteristics  of  our  working  memory  system  really  do  represent  some  sort  of  functional 
shortcoming. Perhaps such characteristics play an adaptive role in our cognitive economy, but these 
roles have simply been overlooked by cognitive psychologists. 
In order to get a better grasp on this sort of argument, it helps to consider the results of a study 
focusing on the learning abilities of artificial neural networks. The study in question concerns Jerry 
Elman’s (1993) attempts to train an artificial neural network to process complex bodies of linguistic 
information. Elman (1993) was interested in whether a particular type of neural network, called a 
recurrent neural network (see Elman, 1990), could be trained to learn about aspects of grammatical 
structure, such as the ability to learn about verb agreement and clause embedding in the sentence 
‘The girls whom the teacher has picked for the play which will be produced next month practice 
every  afternoon’  (example  from  Elman,  1993).  What  Elman  (1993)  aimed  to  do  was  examine 
whether  a  recurrent  neural  network  could  learn  about  the  grammatical  structure  of  complex 
sentences, such as those exhibiting multiple clause embedding and long distance dependencies. In 
particular, the neural network was trained to take one word of a sentence at a time and predict 
what the next word in the sentence might be.  
Unfortunately,  Elman’s  efforts  were  in  vain.  The  network  completely  failed  to  learn  about  the 
grammatical structure of the complex sentences. Not only did the network fail to develop a fully 
generalizable performance profile, it also failed  to adequately master the data on which it was 
trained. In trying to account for these results, Elman (1993) tried an alternative training regime in 
which the network was initially presented with examples of very simple sentences and then exposed 
progressively to more complex ones. The aim was to isolate the precise point at which the network’s 
performance broke down. At what level of sentential complexity would the network prove incapable 
of making further progress? 
The results from this alternative training regimen were surprising. Elman (1993) discovered that 
when presented with staged training inputs (each increasing in complexity) the network was able to 
realize its original training objectives. Thus, what seemed to be important to a network’s ultimate 
ability to learn about grammatically complex sentences was that its training was structured in such a 
way that it was able to learn about the simple  cases first. Once the network was proficient in 
handling these simple cases, it was then able to learn to cope with progressively more complex ones. Extended Memory 
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It  was  almost  as  if  the  network’s  initial  success with  the  simple cases  laid  the  groundwork  for 
subsequent learning about the more complex ones. 
Moving on from this initial result, Elman went on to explore the effects of a further manipulation 
that built on the results of the staged input case. Rather than impose restrictions on the sequential 
order of exposure to training cases, Elman (1993) used an incremental memory solution in which the 
recurrent  feedback  provided  by  the  layer  of  context  units  was  gradually  increased  as  training 
progressed. The effect of this manipulation was to limit the temporal window in which linguistic 
inputs could be processed. It thus forced the network to focus (at least initially) on the simplest 
training cases. And, as the memory provided by the recurrent units was increased over the course of 
training, so the network was able to deal with progressively more complex inputs. The effect of the 
incremental memory solution was thus the same as that achieved by staged training: it promoted an 
initial undersampling of the training data in such a way that the network’s long-term ability to learn 
about complex regularities was enhanced. As Elman (1993) notes, this is an important discovery 
because it may shed light on the functional significance of a developmental progression in human 
cognitive capabilities. Thus, rather than see the working memory limitations of young children (see 
Kail,  1984)  as  a  computational  shortcoming  that  needs  to  be  overcome  in  order  to  reveal  the 
functional profile of adult cognition, Elman’s (1993) findings suggest that such ‘limitations’ may play 
an important (and perhaps indispensable) role in children’s cognitive development:  
“Seen in this light, the early limitations on memory capacity assume a more positive 
character. One might have predicted that the more powerful the network, the greater its 
ability to learn a complex domain. However, this appears not always to be the case. If 
the domain is of sufficient complexity, and if there are abundant false solutions, then the 
opportunities for failure are great. What is required is some way to artificially constrain 
the solution space to just that region which contains the true solution. The initial memory 
limitations fulfil this role; they act as a filter on the input, and focus learning on just that 
subset of facts which lay the foundation for future success.” (pg. 9-10)  
Elman’s (1993) findings thus encourage us to think about the functional significance of what might 
otherwise be seen as a functional shortcoming. Seen from a particular perspective, it might seem as 
though working memory suffers from a number of performance limitations. However, such views 
largely ignore the potential role that such ‘limitations’ play in terms of the broader ecological (e.g. 
developmental and social) contexts in which a human being typically operates. Because most studies 
tend  to  look  at  particular  populations  of  people  (adults)  performing  in  particular  situations 
(laboratory-based studies), it is easy to see how interpretations and perspectives may be skewed. 
Once we isolate a cognitive system from its normal operating environment, many of its processing 
characteristics may appear mysterious, anomalous or ill-suited to the tasks that we present it with. 
In this situation, many aspects of a cognitive system may seem like design flaws. The moral of this 
discussion, therefore,  is that  we  should  not  be too  hasty  in our efforts to identify  and  redress 
functional shortcomings. When seen in their proper ecological context, cognitive systems are likely 
to operate in complex ways with a variety of other forces and factors, and, in all likelihood, what 
initially seemed like a functional shortcoming may, on closer inspection, re-emerge as an essential 
feature of an environmentally-embedded and temporally-extended cognitive agent. Whenever we 
see a defect or deficiency in nature, a desirable feature is probably never far away. Extended Memory 
 
32 
 
Technologies for Total Recall   
An oft maligned aspect of human memory concerns its susceptibility to error. In general, we want 
our memories of the past to be accurate, irrespective of whether we are recalling facts for an exam 
or whether we are trying to recall the details of last year’s birthday party. Accuracy is also often 
highly prized in scientific studies of human memory. The golden yardstick against which our memory 
functions are measured in laboratory situations often concerns the correspondence of our memories 
to some previously encountered set of information items. Psychologists thus seek to ‘test’ human 
memory  by  measuring  the  extent  to  which  we  can  recall  information  presented  at  some 
chronologically earlier stage of an experiment. Any errors in the recall process are typically seen as 
failures of human memory. 
In light of all this, the goal of improving the accuracy of human memory seems like a legitimate and 
sensible target for new memory technologies. Few would question the value of technologies that 
enabled us to remember things with greater accuracy, and even fewer would perhaps suggest that 
memory technologies should encourage us to harbour false or incorrect representations of the past.  
In  spite  of  all  this,  however,  the  assumption  that  truth  is  normative  for  human  memory  is  an 
assumption that should not go unchallenged. In general, we should not seek to develop technologies 
that  augment  or  improve  an  existing  cognitive  capability  without  first  understanding  what  the 
function of the underlying cognitive capability really is. It might seem that one of the goals of human 
bio-memory is the accurate recollection of previously encountered information, but we shouldn’t 
necessarily accept this assumption without first examining the empirical evidence and subjecting the 
assumption to some critical questioning. Truth may be normative for some types of memory, but is 
this the case for all types of memory? And why should we assume that the biological function of 
human memory, in all its many forms, is actually about the veridical representation of the past? 
What is so great about truth, anyway? 
Leonard Shelby, the main character in Memento, is clearly someone who, at first sight, appears to 
value  truth.  Most  of  his  activities  in  the  movie  seem  to  be  concerned  with  the  accurate 
representation of facts as a means to guide his thoughts and actions in semantically-sensible ways. 
Ultimately, of course, we learn that this is only half the truth.  Lennie is actually someone who 
manipulates facts in order to avoid certain truths; for example, the truth that his wife’s death was a 
result  of  his  own  actions.  It  therefore  turns  out  that  Lennie’s  main  goal  is  not  the  accurate 
representation of past reality; rather, he seeks to subvert reality in a way that benefits him. Lennie is 
not really a victim of his amnesia; he benefits from it: his impairment enables him to construct a 
version of events that is far more propitious than the events that actually transpired.  
Following on from the example of Lennie, we can ask whether we would also be any better off if all 
our memories of the past were completely accurate. Perhaps, like Lennie, a certain amount of self-
deception is not such a bad thing. As McKenna (2009) writes: 
“It may well be that some degree of self-deception in human agency is a good thing. We 
are probably all a lot better off believing that we are a little better looking, smarter, 
more interesting, kinder, and more thoughtful than we really are. Were we to live in the 
constant light of the unvarnished truth about ourselves, we’d likely be so burdened that it 
would be hard to get up in the morning.” (pg. 36) Extended Memory 
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At  the  very  least  this  line  of  questioning  should  give  us  pause  for  thought.  There  is  nothing 
necessarily beneficial about remembering the past in all its glorious detail if all we end up with is an 
excess of socially and psychologically disabling recollections. Perhaps it helps if our memories are a 
little hazy and subject to error. And if they are going to be hazy, they might as well be hazy in the 
right way: in a way that portrays us in a positive light and bolsters our self-esteem. 
This idea establishes contact with a body of research concerning the functions of human memory; in 
particular, autobiographical memory. Autobiographical memory refers to the memories we have of 
specific events across the lifespan, and it includes the body of personal knowledge (autobiographical 
knowledge)  that  is  associated  with  our  life  experiences  (Baddeley  et  al.,  2009,  see  chapter  7). 
Autobiographical memory probably plays a key role in providing us with a sense of who we are as 
individuals  (Conway,  2005),  and  for  this  reason  the  features  and  functions  of  autobiographical 
memory have been of considerable interest to those working in memory research. 
Theories about the functions of autobiographical memory tend to fall into one of three categories 
(Alea & Bluck, 2003; Bluck, 2003; Pillemer, 2003; Wilson & Ross, 2003). These include, what Bluck 
(2003) describes as self (e.g. maintaining a largely favourable view of the self), social (e.g. supporting 
social interaction by providing the material for conversation) and directive (e.g. planning for present 
and future behaviour) functions. Of these, the self and social functions are the ones most likely to 
entail distortion, and, in fact, a variety of kinds of error have been documented in the context of 
autobiographical  memory  research.  One  kind  of  error  involves  people’s  judgements  of  when 
particular past events occurred. Wilson and Ross (2003) argue that people are motivated to push 
negative events further back in order to maintain a favourable view of themselves in the present. 
They show how people can distance themselves from negative events by pushing them into the 
distant past, so as to make them no longer relevant to the current self’s well-being. In addition, 
positive events can be pulled forward in time so that the current self can continue to take credit for 
past successes. The function of these distortions, according to Wilson and Ross (2003), is to enable 
people to create and maintain a coherent – and largely positive – view of their present selves and 
associated circumstances. 
There are, of course, occasions when accuracy in recall is important. These are typically cases when 
we  are  required  to  recall  specific  facts  for  particular  purposes  (e.g.  examinations).  In  general, 
however, it is not clear that accuracy is the main function of memory, at least of our episodic 
memories. It is true that we tend to associate memory with our ability to learn, and in these cases 
accuracy seems quintessential to the development of new skills and abilities. But the purpose of 
memory is not to learn. Memory reflects our learning, but we learn little from our memories (if by 
learning we mean some sort of behavioural change). Whatever we learn from our experiences, it  is 
not  something  that  tends  to  get  explicitly  represented  in  consciousness.  Rather,  what  gets 
represented in consciousness during our recollections of the past are the experiences themselves, as 
well as our affective and emotional responses to those experiences. There is no reason why such 
representations have to be entirely veridical, even if it were possible for them to be so. 
When we think of our memories in an evolutionary context, there seem to be further reasons for 
doubting that accuracy is a central feature of episodic memory. In terms of our evolutionary history, 
it is has only been possible to check the veracity of our memories in recent times. Until physical 
recordings of the past could made, using orthographic and pictorial schemes, it was probably very Extended Memory 
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difficult  to  gauge  the  accuracy  of  our  memories.  This  suggests  that  the  emphasis  on  accurate 
representation is something that may have emerged relatively recently in the history of our species. 
It is quite possible that our evolutionary forbears survived perfectly well with recollections of the 
past that were not entirely accurate, and, as mentioned above, there may very well have been a 
distinct  advantage  in  allowing  individual  memories  to  converge  on  common,  consensual 
representations. In this case, the benefits of mnemonic convergence at the collective level may have 
outweighed the costs of mnemonic distortion at the level of the individual (see above). 
The purpose of this section has not been to negate or undermine the value of technologies that 
strive to improve the accuracy of human memory; there are clearly cases when such accuracy is an 
important  concern.  Nevertheless,  I  think  it  is  important  to  be  cautious of  efforts  that  strive  to 
provide blanket improvements in mnemonic accuracy across all types of memory. If accuracy is not 
at the functional heart of a particular kind of memory (e.g. autobiographical memory), then it is 
difficult to see how technological interventions that focus on accuracy are really contributing to an 
improvement  or  enhancement  of  that  particular  aspect  of  mnemonic  functioning.  In  general,  a 
technology improves a cognitive capability if it delivers a profile of enhanced performance in the 
same  areas  as  that  targeted  by  the  original  capability.  If  the  technology  works  to  improve 
performance  in  some  other  area,  then  the  technology  is  not  so  much  improving  the  existing 
capability as installing a new kind of capability, with all the attendant risks that that entails. If the 
primary function of our autobiographical memory system is to support self and social functions (for 
example, maintaining a positive view of the self, bolstering self-esteem, creating a coherent life 
story, and providing material to stimulate conversation), then it is unclear whether technologies that 
improve the accuracy of recall can actually serve to enhance autobiographical memory. Inasmuch as 
such technologies work in opposition to existing processes, they may in fact do more harm than 
good. Rather than focus on accurate recall, a much better focus of attention for such technologies 
might be to concentrate on how to support the human individual in constructing renditions of the 
past that enable them to function better in both the psychological and social domains. In some cases 
at least, this might mean that the best thing memory technologies could do would be to help us 
modify our recollections of the past...or even dispense with them altogether. 
The Role of Biology in Memory Technology Design 
An  important  issue  in  memory  technology  design  concerns  the  extent  to  which  candidate 
technologies are modelled on the representational and computational solutions countenanced by 
biology. This issue is particularly important in the current context because not everyone accepts that 
the kind of resources commonly encountered in discussions of the extended mind (hand-written 
notes, annotated photos, and so on) possess the kind of features that warrant their treatment as 
forms  of  extended  memory.  In  the  original  treatment  of  the  extended  mind  thesis,  Clark  and 
Chalmers (1998) emphasized the nature of the functional contributions made by both the internal 
(biological) and external (technological) resources. The outer resources counted as part of Otto’s 
cognitive  machinery,  they  suggested,  because  the  functional  role  played  the  resources  was 
sufficiently similar to the role played by inner resources as to warrant similarity of treatment: both 
kinds of resources played the same causal role in terms of guiding thought and action, and they 
should thus both be seen as legitimate parts of the machinery of cognition. 
The  problem  when  it  comes  to  notions  of  extended  memory,  however,  is  that  the  differences 
between the biological and non-biological components – the brain on the one hand and notebook Extended Memory 
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scribblings on the other – seem so profound as to negate any possibility of treating the relative 
contributions of the two components in the same way. The functional differences between the inner 
and outer resources seem so great that it seems utterly inappropriate to talk about them in the 
same cognitive terms. One critic of the extended mind thesis thus writes: “the external portions of 
extended  ‘memory’  states  (processes)  differ  so  greatly  from  internal  memories  (the  process  of 
remembering) that they should be treated as distinct kinds” (Rupert, 2004, pg. 407).  
One example of this sort of criticism is provided by Weizkopf (2008). Weizkopf suggests that a core 
feature of genuine beliefs is that they are informationally-integrated with one another. This means 
that as new information is received, all the agent’s pre-existing beliefs are dynamically updated in 
order to ensure global consistency and coherence. Unfortunately, while this happens automatically 
in the case of the biological brain, it is not something that we see in the case of external encodings. 
In this case, the encodings are not subject to the sort of dynamic updating mechanism encountered 
in the biological realm, and thus they do not qualify as the material vehicles of belief states:   
“To count as a belief a state has to be part of a system of states in which processes of 
integration  and  updating  function  to  keep  the  subject’s  mental  contents  in  epistemic 
equilibrium to some degree or other.” (Weiskopf, 2008, pg. 268) 
To exemplify the  differences  between  the  inner and  outer  resources, Weiskopf  suggests that  a 
normal  human  agent who  believes  that MOMA  is on  53
rd  street  and  who  later  learns  that  the 
museum has been demolished will no longer believe that the museum is on 53
rd street – the original 
belief will be automatically revised upon receipt of the new information. In addition to this, other 
related beliefs (for example, the belief that MOMA is a good place to get a latte on 53rd street) will 
also be subject to this form of automatic updating mechanism. The result will be that, within a 
normal cognitive agent, all beliefs will be in a state of what Weiskopf calls “epistemic equilibrium”. 
This is not so in the case of Otto – the mnemonically-impaired agent who relies on his notebook to 
store  information.  In  this  case,  the  inscriptions  in  the  notebook  are  not  subject  to  automatic 
updating, and this means, according to Weiskopf, that they should not count as the vehicles of 
Otto’s dispositional belief states. 
Inasmuch as Weiskopf is right, then, it seems that we do need to play close attention to the details 
of biological implementation. In particular, we need to understand what it is about the nature of 
biological encoding that makes  bio-memory systems capable of the sort of automatic updating that 
Weiskopf describes. Before we accept this conclusion, however, it is worth considering a number of 
counterarguments.  Firstly,  just  because  informational  integration  and  automatic  updating  is 
important (even if it is important), this does not mean that we have to emulate biological solutions 
in order to achieve the same result. The kind of capability highlighted by Weiskopf is something that 
could, in theory at least, be accomplished by technological components that are considerably more 
sophisticated  than  the  case  of  a  simple  notebook.  Thus,  just  because  one  particular  kind  of 
technological solutions lacks the requisite functional features Weiskopf alludes to, this does not 
mean that other kinds of more advanced technological solutions could not fit the bill, irrespective of 
whether or not they pay heed to biology. 
Another caveat concerns the extent to which Weiskopf really is correct in his characterization of the 
way bio-memory actually works. As Clark (2005) comments, it is by no means clear that biological 
memory  actually  does  manage  to  track  and  dynamically  alter  all  beliefs  in  quite  the  way  that Extended Memory 
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Weiskopf suggests. It seems entirely possible that logical consistency and global coherence of belief 
states is accomplished in some other way – perhaps via a kind of active reasoning process over 
bodies of related information that are associatively linked and simultaneously activated at retrieval 
time.  
Finally,  we  can  question  whether  Weiskopf  is  really  right  to  place  so  much  emphasis  on  the 
importance of informational integration and dynamic updating when it comes to establishing the 
conditions  for  cognitive  extension.  The  emphasis  is  well-placed  argues  Weiskopf  because  1)  it 
identifies a key functional difference between the biological and non-biological components, and 2) 
the  difference  matters  because  informationally-integrated  belief  states  support  the  kind  of 
intelligent  behaviours  that  we  typically  ascribe  to  cognitive  agents.  However,  while  it  seems 
impossible to deny the first of these points, it is not clear that the second point necessarily follows 
from the first. Is it really the case that informational integration is a prerequisite for the kind of 
behaviours warranting the ascription of belief to an agent? Would we still not be inclined to explain 
behaviour in terms of belief states, irrespective of whether those beliefs were logically consistent 
with the other beliefs the agent held? Clark (2010) touches on this issue when he writes: 
“True, that which is stored in Otto’s notebook won’t shift and alter while stored away. It 
won’t  participate  in  the  ongoing  underground  reorganizations,  interpolations,  and 
creative mergers that characterize much of biological memory. But when called upon, its 
immediate  contributions  to  Otto’s  behaviour  still  fit  the  profile  of  a  stored  belief. 
Information retrieved from the notebook will guide Otto’s reasoning and behaviour in 
the same way as information retrieved from biomemory. The fact that WHAT is retrieved 
may be different is unimportant here.”  
A more general response to concerns about functional differences between the biological and non-
biological resources is to deny that any such differences are actually of importance when it comes to 
the realization of technologically-extended cognitive systems. The basis for this claim is that what 
matters when it comes to cognitive extension is not so much the functional differences between 
various resources as the way in which those resources support patterns of behaviour that warrant 
the ascription of particular cognitive states and processes to the agent in question. On this view, 
what it means for some technological component to be part of an extended memory system is that 
the  component  makes  functional  contributions  to  behaviour  in  ways  that  supports  talk  of  that 
behaviour as being the product of particular memories and memory-related processes. It should be 
clear that there are a variety of ways in which this state-of-affairs could be brought about. In some 
cases, a memory technology might be required to emulate aspects of biological function, while in 
other cases some other type of implementation strategy might be called for. However, there is 
nothing that requires the outer components to function in precisely the same manner as the inner 
ones. In fact, in most cases, I suspect that the outer will not function like the inner simply because 
the  inner  and  outer  are  required  to  function  together  in  order  to  give  rise  to  psychologically-
interesting and interpretable patterns of behaviour. This emphasis on complementarity between the 
inner and outer resources has, in fact, been an increasingly common aspect of debates about the 
extended mind in recent years (Sutton, 2010). 
None of this, of course, implies that a consideration of biology is irrelevant or unimportant when it 
comes to the implementation of biotechnologically-extended minds. Part of what it means to be a 
technology apt for incorporation into a biological agent’s cognitive processing routines is that it be Extended Memory 
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designed to work in concert with the agent’s existing capabilities. This, then, is one reason why the 
study of biological systems is important: it provides an understanding of the kind of pre-existing 
capabilities that a candidate technology might build on, work with or exploit in order to yield desired 
behaviours. 
Another reason for studying biological systems is, of course, the insight and inspiration they provide 
to  complex  engineering  challenges  (e.g.  Shadbolt,  2004).  In  this  case,  the  lessons  learned  from 
biology might provide productive inroads into a number of difficult capability areas for memory 
technology  solutions.  These  include,  among  other  things,  the  need  for  highly  context-sensitive 
information retrieval solutions that are able to provide proactive support and guidance to an agent 
without  the  need  for  explicit  instruction;  the  need  for  computationally  efficient  modes  of 
information retrieval that are capable of dealing with vast repositories of data collected across the 
lifespan; and the need for information storage solutions that economize on the use of available 
representational resources.   
Conclusion 
Extended  cognition  accounts  earn  their  scientific  keep  to  the  extent  that  they  enable  us  to 
understand cognitive systems and cognitive phenomena. In this paper, I have discussed the notion of 
cognitive extension and applied it to a specific aspect of human cognition, namely memory. I have 
suggested that some kinds of memory phenomena may be better understood once we factor in the 
contributions made by the resources of our social and physical environments, and I have argued that 
in some cases, such as the case with socially-distributed remembering, there are compelling reasons 
for counting non-biological resources as part of an extended information processing network that 
constitutes the material basis of human memory. I thus conclude that an extended approach to 
memory research improves our understanding of existing research findings, and it also serves as a 
potent stimulus for further scientific research. 
The possibility of extended memory systems heralds rich opportunities for technology design and 
development.  In  particular,  if  the  machinery  of  memory  is  partly  constituted  by  information 
processing loops that extend beyond the neural realm, then it seems we have an easily accessible 
means by which memory performance can be influenced. By targeting the non-neural elements of 
the memory system, technological interventions could enhance memory in ways that are just as 
profound  as  those  promised  by  the  vision  of  memory-enhancing  drugs.  However,  before  we 
wholeheartedly  embrace  the  vision  of  bio-technologically  extended  memory,  it  is  important  to 
understand exactly what the functional target of such technologies should be. In this paper, I have 
argued  that  a  simplistic  notion  of memory  technologies  as  promoting  the recall  of  greater  and 
greater amounts of information with ever-increasing degrees of accuracy may not be warranted. The 
design of memory technologies should be based on a careful consideration of what it is that memory 
buys us. In some cases, memory enables us to relive the past, while in other cases it enables us to be 
relieved  of  the  past.  The  design  of  memory  technologies  should  thus  be  based  on  a  better 
understanding of the memory system as situated in its proper ecological context – that extended 
nexus of representational and computational elements that helps to make us who we are. 
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